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Abstract
Informal employment is the hallmark of developing economies. Egypt is no exception to
this trend. Those who are informally employed are exceptionally vulnerable as they lack social
protection. Moreover, large informal sectors are symptomatic of underdevelopment and have
negative repercussions on the economy. Few studies examine the determinants of labor market
transitions in Egypt with a focus on transitions between formal and informal labor market states.
This study focuses on determinants of labor market transitions in Egypt, relying on the Egyptian
Labor Market Panel Surveys of 2012 and 2018. It develops four multinomial logistic regression
models to achieve this goal. The main independent variables examined are education, gender, age
group, father’s level of education (a proxy for social class), and area of residence. The findings
reveal the immobility of Egyptian women in the labor market except if they are moving to
unemployment or inactivity. The youth seem to be particularly vulnerable as they are less likely
to transition from informal to formal salaried employment. Moreover, self-employment is less
accessible to the youth (hence they are less likely to transition to it), and youth in self-employment
are less likely to remain/succeed there. This effectively means the youth are trapped in informal
salaried employment. Moreover, educational attainment increases the odds of transition towards
formal salaried employment and reduces flows out of it. The study also finds that non-employed,
highly educated individuals are queuing in non-employment until they can find a position in formal
salaried employment.
Keywords: Informal Employment – Informal Sector – Informality – Self-employment – labor market
transitions – Entrepreneurship.
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1 Introduction:
Informal employment is the hallmark of labor markets in developing economies. Even though
there is no consensus over the definition of informal employment, a widely cited definition is the
one developed by the International Council for Labor Statisticians (ICLS). Defining informal
employment (informality) first requires defining the related concept of the informal sector.
According to the 15th ICLS, the informal sector is the subset of household enterprises that is not
registered according to national legislation(International Labor Office, 1993). In recognition of the
fact that many workers employed in formal sector firms have an informal employment
relationship, the ICLS 17th guidelines developed the concept of informal employment, including
informal sector employees and informal salaried workers in the formal sector (ILO, 2004). The
informality of the employment relationship for workers is widely measured in the empirical
literature with reference to the possession of a written contract and/orsocial security registration.
In 2018, the ILO estimated the number of informal workers by two billion workers accounting
for nearly 61% of employment worldwide. Africa has the highest rate of informal by far, nearly
86%, Asia and the Pacific and Arab states come in second place with 68% informal employment
in each. Egypt is no exception to other developing economies. Estimates from the Egyptian Labor
Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) indicate that the percentage of salaried workers between 15-64
years without a contract or social security registration increased from nearly 46% to 58% between
2012 and 2018. Moreover, the percentage of employed individuals not covered by social security
increased from about 61% to almost 72% (ERF & CAPMAS, 2012, 2018).
There are many reasons why we should care about informal employment from a policy
perspective. First, informal workers face overlapping vulnerabilities; they fall through the cracks
of the social protection system(Maloney & Arias, 2007). Since informal employment is often
defined in terms of lack of social security benefits, informal workers are uninsured against the
risks of death, old age, sickness, unemployment, and disability. In addition to being uninsured
against these risks, informal employees, especially those in the informal sector, are more prone to
occupational hazards and injuries(International Labor Organization, 2009). They also earn less
compared to workers in the formal sector, otherwise known as the informal wage penalty, largely
reflecting their lower levels of human capital(Ohnsorge & Yu, 2022). Second, the existence of a
large informal sector in the economy is indicative of underdevelopment. Economies with large
informal sectors have higher rates of poverty, lower income per capita, and inefficient institutions.
5

Third, the informal sector has a negative impact on the economy as informal firms are less
productive than their formal counterparts (Ohnsorge & Yu, 2022). Moreover, since informal firms
do not pay taxes, they erode the government's revenue base and reduce its ability to provide public
services(Jessen & Kluve, 2021).
There are three theoretical views regarding the motives of workers in joining the informal
sector. Labor market segmentation theory holds that the labor market is split into a formal market
with good jobs (e.g., higher wages, social protection, and good working conditions) and an
informal one with low-quality jobs (e.g., lower wages, lack of social protection). Workers are
excluded from the formal sector and shoved into the informal counterpart because of barriers to
entry. Contrarily, the second view holds that workers voluntarily exit the formal sector because
they have a comparative advantage in the informal sector and because it offers many non-wage
benefits to workers, such as flexibility. A third view contends that the informal sector is a mixture
of both exclusion and exit(Maloney & Arias, 2007). Many empirical studies find evidence of the
heterogeneity of the informal sector (e.g. (Harati, 2013; Nemoto & Zuo, 2017)
Another concern among scholars studying informal employment is understanding its macro
determinants, such as labor market regulations (Besley & Burgess, 2004; Wahba, 2009b) and trade
liberalization (Salem & Zaki, 2019; Selwaness & Zaki, 2015). Scholars have also highlighted the
impacts of micro-determinants of informality(Angel-Urdinola & Tanabe, 2012; Danquah et al.,
2019; Roushdy & Selwaness, 2019) and the determinants of transitions between formal and
informal labor market states (Bernabè & Stampini, 2009; Tansel & Acar, 2017; Tansel & Ozdemir,
2019).
This study falls within the branch of the literature that focuses on transitions between formal
and informal labor market states. Studies on labor market transitions in Egypt (Tansel & Ozdemir,
2019; Wahba, 2009a)use older versions of the Egyptian labor market panel survey (ELMPS).
Wahba examines “graduation” from informal to formal employment by focusing on the impact of
gender and education exclusively. (Tansel & Ozdemir, 2019) by contrast, define six labor market
states and rely on a larger variety of independent variables and their interactions. The current study
updates the knowledge on labor market transitions in Egypt by relying on the two latest versions
of ELMPS (2012-2018). The main research question the thesis seeks to answer is as follows:
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What are the determinants shaping labor market transitions, with a special focus on transitions
between formal salaried employment and informal employment (including informal salaried
employment and self-employment)?
This research question can further be divided into the following sub-questions:
1. How does the individual’s level of educational attainment shape their labor market
transitions?
2. How does age contribute to labor market transitions? Are some age groups faring better
than others?
3. How do labor market transition patterns vary by gender?
4. How does social class affect transitions in the labor market?
5. How does the area of residence affect an individual worker’s chances of moving from
one state to the other in the labor market?

The research question is answered through a quantitative methodology relying on Egyptian
labor market panel surveys for the years 2012 and 2018. Four labor market states are identified:
formal salaried employment, informal salaried employment, self-employment, and nonemployment. The sample will be split into four subsamples according to the labor market state in
2012, and a multinomial logistic regression will be estimated for each one of them. The dependent
variable is the labor market state in 2018. It is a categorical variable composed of the same
categories mentioned earlier. The independent variables of interest are age, education, father’s
level of education, gender, and area of residence. Other controls included in the four models are
marital status and household size.
The findings of the study reveal that the youth are entrapped in informal salaried employment.
On the one hand, they are less likely to transition from informal to formal salaried employment.
On the other hand, they are less likely than older age groups to access self-employment and succeed
7

in it. Moreover, educational attainment increases the odds of transition towards formal salaried
employment and reduces flows out of it. The study also finds that non-employed, highly educated
individuals are queuing in non-employment until they can find a position in formal salaried
employment. In conformity with the previous studies on MENA, Egyptian women are immobile
except if they are moving into inactivity.
The thesis is divided as follows; the second section lays down the literature review, discussing
research on developed and developing countries. The third section explains the contextual
framework of the study, including a brief on the conditions of the economy and the labor market
in Egypt, relevant legislative frameworks, and employment policies. The fourth section then
presents the conceptual framework, focusing on the definitions of informal employment and the
informal sector, various hypotheses about how informality relates to other variables, and the
methodologies used by scholars to prove/disprove the existence of these relationships. The fifth
section presents the data and methodology, while the sixth section highlights the empirical findings
and the discussion. Finally, the seventh section concludes and provides some policy
recommendations.
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2 Literature Review
This section reviews the literature on precarious employment in developed countries and
informal in developing countries. Unlike the operational definition of informal employment, which
usually focuses on the lack of a contract and/or social security, precarious employment
encompasses multiple deprivations facing workers in the labor market, including low pay,
disempowerment, and lack of protection under labor and social insurance laws. Given the dearth
of research on informality in developed countries, studies on precarious employment in developed
countries are included in this literature review. This section is structured around the following
themes: determinants of informal/precarious employment, determinants of transition between
informal(precarious) and formal(non-precarious) labor market states, labor market segmentation,
macro-determinants of informality(precarity), and informal/precarious employment and gender.
The analysis of each branch of the literature first proceeds with discussing the literature on
developed economies, followed by the literature on developing countries, attempting to contrast
them, and finally, the literature on Egypt/MENA whenever available.

2.1 Determinants of Informal/precarious Employment:
One branch of the literature discovers the variables associated with informal/precarious
labor market states (the micro-determinants of informal/precarious employment). For example
(Williams & Horodnic, 2018) discover the determinants of informal employment using European
Working Conditions Survey. Other studies on the European union focus instead on the
determinants of precarious employment (Kretsos & Livanos, 2016; Orfao et al., 2021). Studies on
developing countries also share the concern with micro-determinants of informal employment such
as (Danquah et al., 2019; Khamis, 2012; Lehmann & Zaiceva, 2013), which focus on sub-Saharan
African countries, Mexico, and Russia, respectively. Similar studies on informal employment were
conducted in the context of the MENA region (Angel-Urdinola & Tanabe, 2012; Ezzat et al.,
2019), comparing the status of informal employment between the case studies. Others focused
exclusively on Egypt, including (Assaad & Krafft, 2020; L. Fedi, 2019; Roushdy & Selwaness,
2019). The studies in this branch of the literature often rely on multinomial logistic or probit
regression to answer their research questions depending on the number of labor market states
specified in the empirical model.
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2.2 Determinants of Labor Market Transitions:
The second group of studies focuses on determinants of transitions between formal/nonprecarious and informal/precarious employment. In contrast to the first group of studies, this
analysis is dynamic. In developed countries, the literature revolves around transitions from
precarious employment using a multiplicity of methodologies such as event history analysis in
Germany(Reichelt, 2015) and Multichannel sequence analysis combined with a multinomial
logistic regression in the Netherlands(Mattijssen et al., 2020) and cluster analysis combined with
multinomial logistic regressions in Spain(López-Andreu & Verd, 2016). These methodologies
allow for a more fine-grained analysis of the trajectories of employment precarity and the factors
affecting it and require a wealth of data that is lacking in developing country contexts. By contrast,
studies on developing countries estimate the determinants of transitions between formal and
informal states using multinomial logit regression ((Bernabè & Stampini, 2009; Gutierrez et al.,
2019; Maciel & Oliveira, 2018; Tansel & Acar, 2017). Studies on Egypt follow the same analytical
strategy applied in other developing countries(Tansel & Ozdemir, 2019; Wahba, 2009a). Dynamic
studies on developing countries using multinomial logistic regression have the potential to reveal
interesting trends in the labor market; however, specifying too many labor market states could lead
to computational difficulties since a separate regression has to be run for each labor market state
defined.
The independent variables considered in static and dynamic studies (branches 1&2 of the
literature) include: (1) supply-side factors, namely gender, age, marital status, educational
attainment, work experience, citizenship status and race, household size, and the existence of
dependents. (2) Demand-side factors such as the sector of employment, occupation, firm size, and
the level of occupational skill required for the job.

2.3 Labor Market Segmentation:
Labor market segmentation studies in developed countries are focused on discovering the
number of segments into which the labor market is divided. For example(Lukac et al., 2019; Seo,
2021; Yoon & Chung, 2016) use latent class analysis in order to discern labor market divisions in
a number of European economies instead of making assumptions about the factors/dimensions
10

dividing the labor market into insiders and outsiders, such as the case in (Häusermann &
Schwander, 2012; Schwander & Häusermann, 2013). Interestingly, the literature on developed
countries is not concerned with verifying whether barriers to entry exist between the different
segments of the labor market, an important condition for proving the existence of segmentation.
In sum, these studies seem to indicate that precarity is a multifaceted concept. Moreover, the
market is not exactly dual; it could be divided into a core market of insiders existing alongside
several outsider markets characterized by varying degrees of precarity.
In studies on developing countries, scholars used a myriad of methodologies to gauge the
existence of barriers to entry and hence to labor market segmentation. They can generally be
classified into three categories.
•

Calculating transition probabilities: A practical implication of labor market segmentation
is that the flows from the informal to the formal sector are higher than the flows in the other
ways around. This indicates that workers enter the informal sector and queue in it- because
of barriers to entry- until they manage to find a position in the formal sector. (Bernabè &
Stampini, 2009; Bosch & Maloney, 2010; Pagés & Stampini, 2009);

•

Estimating the formal/informal wage gap: Some scholars contend that barriers to entry
exist if there is a wage gap between equally endowed individuals in the formal and informal
sectors. By using OLS and Quantile regressions with fixed effects, it is possible to
determine the wage gap between the two sectors while taking time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity into account. The use of quantile regressions also allows for quantifying the
gap across the income distribution. (Bargain & Kwenda, 2014; Nguyen et al., 2013;
Nordman et al., 2016; Tansel et al., 2020; Tansel & Acar, 2016) and.

•

Estimating finite mixture models: According to (Günther & Launov, 2012; Nemoto & Zuo,
2017), entry barriers exist if the workers are under-represented in the sector that maximizes
their wages given their human capital. This can be gauged by using finite mixture models.
Increasingly, however, many studies on developing countries find empirical evidence to

support the heterogeneity of the informal sector rather than lending support to the segmentation or
competitive market hypotheses.
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Studies on Egypt share the concerns of the literature on developing countries, such as
understanding the informal market through finite mixture models (Harati, 2013) and estimating
the informal wage penalty (Tansel et al., 2020). One last study that deals with the wage gap
between the formal and informal sector is that of (El-haddad & Gadallah, 2020), which shows that
informal employment in the private sector has contributed to increasing wage inequality between
2006 and 2012 in Egypt; During this period, the influx of workers from the public sector and the
lack of minimum wage in the informal sector were responsible for the reduction of the wage level
in the informal sector and consequently increasing wage inequality. Nonetheless, this study does
not aim to prove/disprove the segmentation hypothesis (barriers to entry).

2.4 Macro-determinants of Informal/precarious Employment:
2.4.1 Labor Market Regulations:
A fourth branch of the literature investigates the macro-determinants or causes of
informal/precarious employment. Labor market regulation is one potential determinant.
In the empirical literature on developed countries, there is disagreement as to the impact of
labor market regulations on the rise of precarious employment. While the recommendations of
international organizations push towards the flexibilization of labor market regulations in order to
put an end to labor market precarity and dualization(European Commission, 2012), there is fear
that labor market flexibility ushered as a solution to the ills of labor markets is no more than a
myth. As a matter of fact, it resulted in higher labor precarity and labor market segmentation, the
opposite of what it was intended to achieve (Piasna & Myant, 2017; Rubery et al., 2016).
The evidence from developing countries, however, supports the hypothesis that labor
market reforms (flexibilization) reduce informal employment while strict labor market regulations
increase informality; A classic study in this regard is (Besley & Burgess, 2004) study on India, in
which they estimate the impact of amendments to the industrial disputes act, on various
manufacturing sector outcomes in India. The authors ultimately find that pro-worker amendments
(more strict regulations) resulted in lower output and employment in the formal manufacturing
sector as well as higher output in the informal sector and a rise in urban poverty. Other literature
on India supports this finding. (Sapkal, 2016) finds evidence that strict employment protection
laws and intense enforcement thereof raise the incidence of informal employment, while (Goldar
& Aggarwal, 2012) indicate that increasing flexibility lowers the probability of being informally
employed in the manufacturing sector. Studies on Brazil (Bosch et al., 2012; Bosch & Esteban12

Pretel, 2012) similarly conclude that reducing hiring and/or firing costs lead to a decline in
informal employment.
In the case of Egypt (Wahba, 2009b; Wahba & Assaad, 2017; Yassin & Langot, 2018)
found that the introduction of the 2003 labor law, which reduced the costs of hiring and firing,
decreased informal employment. Interestingly, Yassin and & Langot (2018) find that the public
sector’s higher wages “tends to cancel out the positive effect on the private formal sector’s job
creation and may even reduce it.”
2.4.2 Trade Liberalization:
Within this branch of the literature, trade liberalization as measured by trade tariffs or
import penetration is another important macro-driver of informal employment. This strand of the
literature is specific to developing countries that shifted from a socialist economic strategy based
on import substitution toward liberal export-based economies. The empirical evidence on the
impact of trade liberalization has been inconclusive. Paz finds evidence that a decrease in import
tariffs in Brazil increases informal employment, but the evidence is not robust to different
specifications(Paz, 2014). Similarly, (Goldar & Aggarwal, 2012) find that the impact of import
penetration on informal employment in India is positive and statistically significant for workers
with primary to less than higher education only. Likewise, (Dix-Carneiro & Kovak, 2017) exploit
the regional differences in tariff reductions in Brazil and find that tariff reductions reduce formal
employment and earnings and that the impact grows through time. Interestingly, (Ponczek &
Ulyssea, 2021) consider the role of tariff reduction in Brazil while accounting for the degree of
strictness in enforcing labor regulations which vary regionally. They find that trade liberalization
in the presence of strict enforcement of labor laws does not lead to increased informal employment
but increases unemployment. Meanwhile, regions that are laxer in the application of labor laws
didn’t face rising unemployment but instead witnessed a surge of informal employment in the
wake of trade liberalization. Findings from Mexico (Ben Yahmed & Bombarda, 2020) are more
nuanced as they suggest that the impact of trade liberalization varies across gender, skill level and
sector of employment.
Studies on the impact of trade liberalization in Egypt (Selwaness & Zaki, 2015) find that
trade openness reduced informal employment even after controlling for the possible impacts of
other simultaneous policy measures such as public sector privatization and the ensuing
13

employment reductions. A later study(Salem & Zaki, 2019) interacts the effect of the tariff
reductions with that of the labor market flexibility introduced by the labor law of 2003. The
findings remain unchanged.
2.4.3 Other Determinants:
Other macro-determinants discovered by the literature in the MENA region are the impact
of political stability (Elsayed & Wahba, 2019) and institutional context (Ezzat et al., 2019). The
authors conclude that political stability ensuing from the Arab spring has contributed to rising
informal employment for high and low educated groups alike, while a corrupt institutional
environment is associated with a higher probability of informality.

2.5 Informal Employment and Gender:
Another branch of the literature discovers the interaction between informal/precarious
employment and gender. The literature on developed countries recognizes the connections between
precarity and gender. A recent EU commissioned qualitative report discovers the different aspects
of female precarity, taking an intersectional approach that incorporates age and race(European
Union, 2020). Other studies consider the patterns of precarious work quantitatively, either
generally (Cranford et al., 2004)or with reference to female-dominated sectors(Jokela, 2019).
These studies point to the fact that precarity has a feminine face indeed. Another prominent
concern is explaining gender differences in precarity. For example, (C. Young, 2010) examines
gender differences precarity and ultimately finds that discrepancies are explained by human capital
differences between men and women as well as discrimination. Similarly,(Fuller & Vosko, 2008)
find that a great portion of the wage gap between males and females in permanent jobs and males
and females in precarious jobs is explained by human capital factors though a small portion
remains unexplained. Another important strand within this literature focuses on the relationship
between employment precarity and fertility intentions and indicates that females in precarious
employment relations tend to delay having children because precarity translates into inability to
provide adequately for their children (Modena et al., 2014; Schmitt, 2021).
The concern with the gender of precarity in developed countries literature is mirrored by
concern for the feminization of informal employment in developing countries especially following
the implementation of structural adjustment policies(Cerrutti, 2000; Floro & Schaefer, 1998).
More recently, researchers have compared the gender wage gap between the formal and the
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informal sector. (Ben Yahmed, 2018)finds evidence that the gender wage gap in the informal sector
in Brazil ceases to be statistically significant when observed and unobserved characteristics are
accounted for while it remains statistically significant and increases with educational level in the
formal sector. The empirical evidence from India suggests that the unexplained component of the
wage gap is higher for the informal sector compared to the formal sector (Deininger et al., 2013;
Duraisamy & Duraisamy, 2016).
Others, such as (Berniell et al., 2021), focused on the impact of the birth of the first child
on female employment in Chile and found that it increases the probability of female employment
in informal jobs. Likewise, (Herrera et al., 2019) find evidence of the increased likelihood of teen
moms to participate in informal work compared to non-mothers, but the results are not robust to
different specifications.
I was able to detect one study relating gender to informality in Egypt; (Assaad & Arntz, 2005)
which attempts to understand why the informalization of employment unleashed by the adoption
of SAP was coupled with defeminization of the labor market. The study proposed two reasons
behind this paradox; the first reason is the impact of “oil-related revenues on the structure of labor
demand.” That is, oil revenues negatively impacted sectors that employ women (e.g., exportoriented manufacturing) while increasing the growth of industries and sectors that employ men
more frequently. The second reason is the limited geographical mobility (commuting) for women
in comparison to men.
This study falls within the branch of the literature that focuses on transitions between formal
and informal labor market states. Of the studies reviewed herein on labor market transitions, only
two are about Egypt (Tansel & Ozdemir, 2019; Wahba, 2009a). These studies use older versions
of ELMPS (2006 and 2012). (Wahba, 2009a) examines the transition from informal to formal
employment exclusively using two regressors only, education and gender, while (Tansel &
Ozdemir, 2019) take a more holistic approach and examine transitions between six labor market
states. They develop a multinomial logistic model with more independent variables. The current
study updates the knowledge on labor market transitions in Egypt by relying on the latest version
of ELMPS dating to 2018. It specifies more labor market states than in (Wahba, 2009a) but less
than those specified in (Tansel & Ozdemir, 2019), thereby providing a holistic view of the labor
market while keeping the focus on the most important transitions instead of fragmenting the
15

analysis, especially that the sample size is already too small. Even though this study relies on a
smaller number of regressors compared to (Tansel & Ozdemir, 2019) due to a large number of
missing observations in some variables and the computational difficulties due to the small sample
size, it still includes the most important and policy-relevant variables in addition to a variable not
used in earlier studies on labor market transitions which is father’s level of educational attainment.
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3 Contextual and Legislative Frameworks
3.1 Historical Background and Macro-Economic Causes of Informality
During the 1960s, Egypt adopted a state-centric development model, which included offering
guaranteed employment to high school and university graduates(Barsoum, 2015). In 1974, under
the leadership of Anwar Al-Sadat, the country shifted to an “open door” policy which included
trade liberalization, involving the private sector in the economy, and welcoming foreign
investments. During this time, the Egyptian economy prospered due to the rise in the oil prices
which Egypt exported, the inflow of remittances from Egyptians working abroad, thriving tourism,
and the re-opening of the Suez Canal(Assaad & Arntz, 2005; Barsoum, 2015). The additional
revenue made it possible for the government to expand government employment, nonetheless with
some delay in hiring cohorts, all while maintaining a liberalized economy. Between 1960 and
1990, the government was the main employer, which resulted in the development of an “overstaffed and inefficient public sector”(Elsayed & Wahba, 2019). Government employment is used
by authoritarian governments in MENA to win over politically significant groups, such as the
educated middle class in the case of Egypt. (Assaad, 2014).
The plunge in the oil prices in the 1980s forced Egypt to resort to International Financial
Institutions. However, the stabilization efforts attempted in the decade were unsuccessful
(Assad,2002). The gulf war and the subsequent decline in worker remittances and tourism revenue
exacerbated the economic turmoil. In 1991 Egypt implemented the economic reform and structural
adjustment program (ERSAP), which resulted in a decline in public sector investments,
privatization of state enterprises, and abandoning the guaranteed employment scheme(Barsoum,
2015). Governments of the MENA region, in general, did not resort to laying off existing
government/public sector workers but instead slowed hiring, thereby laying the burden of
government apparatus cuts on the shoulders of newcomers to the labor market (outsiders) who, to
their discontent, are forced to queue for jobs in the public sector or resort to the informal sector
temporarily until they manage to land a job in the formal sector(Assaad, 2014). Hence, the reorientation of government policy from socialism to an open-market economy was especially
damaging for the youth contemporaries of structural adjustment(Barsoum, 2015). Despite the
reduction in the public sector and government employment, it is still utilized every now and then
as a “political tool to address youth unemployment. The increase in government hiring following
the revolution is a case in point(Barsoum, 2017). The reforms were, however, not successful in
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deregulating the labor market nor in establishing a competition authority or reforming the tax
system. As a result, the growth of the formal private sector and formal private employment were
thwarted while informal employment flourished.(El-haddad & Gadallah, 2020).
It wasn’t until the mid-2000s that the government passed a new tax law (91/2005),
competition law (3/2005), and a new labor law (Law 12 of 2003). Nonetheless, they were
unsuccessful in substantially increasing the size of the private sector and its share of employment
due to policy capture and corruption of crony businessmen close to the political regime(El-haddad
& Gadallah, 2020). Policy capture, another component of the so-called authoritarian bargain,
created an unfriendly business environment and consequently an economic landscape dominated
by micro firms – which are less likely to be formal- and a lack of medium-sized firms, otherwise
known as the “missing middle.” (Krafft & Assaad, 2015) low demand for labor ensuing from
policy capture is responsible for high levels of unemployment, especially among the uneducated
female youth, underemployment (including involuntarily working for fewer hours as well as the
mismatch between jobs and qualification), female inactivity and labor informalization. (Assaad,
Krafft, et al., 2020).
The 2008 International economic crisis further decreased employment in export-oriented
industries and contributed to the increase in informal employment. Another contributing factor to
the increase in informality was the freeze in public sector hiring since 2003(El-haddad & Gadallah,
2020). The neoliberal orientation of the government that started with ERSAP intensified during
the 2000s under the leadership of Ahmad Nazif. The official narrative showcased the government’s
macroeconomic achievements exemplified by sustained economic growth while ignoring the
brewing realities of heightened poverty, inequality, and worsening living conditions created by the
government's economic policies. The latter eventually culminated in the 25th of January uprising
(Barsoum, 2015). The political instability ensuing from the uprising further contributed to
increasing informal employment for the educated and uneducated alike (Elsayed & Wahba, 2019)
Moreover, the revolution resulted in economic turmoil. The GDP dropped while the budget
deficit rose significantly as a percentage of the GDP due to the elevated government expenditure
(driven largely by salaries and interest payments) coupled with a reduction in government revenue.
The result was a situation where the country was highly indebted. To make matters worse, the
already existing trade deficit increased after the revolution. Additionally, foreign currency sources,
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namely exports, remittances, foreign direct investments, tourism, and Suez Canal revenues, were
hit severely. In the light of the increased economic vulnerability, Egypt signed an agreement with
the International Monetary fund in November 2016 to receive 12 billion dollars, provided it
implemented several structural and stabilization reforms. The reform measures can be classified
into three broad categories(Eldeep and Zaki 2021; The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy
2018):
•

Internal stabilization reforms geared towards minimizing government expenditures:
including employment reduction in the public sector, freezing wage adjustments for public
sector employees, and cutting fuel, electricity, and water subsidies. To enhance revenues,
the government enacted the value-added tax law (67/2016), which replaced the sales tax.

•

External stabilization, including devaluating the exchange rate.

•

Structural reforms: include enacting an industrial licensing law, a new investment law, and
a bankruptcy law aimed at creating a business-friendly environment.
•

The reforms also included expansion in safety nets for the poorest segments of

society, notably on the Takaful and Karama non-contributory social assistance, as well as
increasing spending on food subsidies.
Commentators pointed out the negative socio-economic effect these reforms would have on
increasing the cost of living, especially for the poorest households (el-Badrawi & Corkery, 2017).
They also pointed to the reduced spending on health and education to reduce the budget deficit(The
Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy 2018). According to Household Income, Expenditure and
Consumption Survey (HIECS), the national poverty headcount rose from 27.8% in 2015 to 32.5%
in 2018, thereby lending confirmation to these fears.
The trend of increasing informal employment continued between 2012 and 2018 since
public employment decreased even further during the period while private formal employment
increased only marginally. The net result was a rise in informal employment. Moreover, the
increasing informalization of labor between 2012-2018 has substantially restricted the access of
the middle class to formal employment, which is evidence of the “hollowing out” of the middle
class. Additionally, the period between 2006-2018 has witnessed an increase in the share of
informal employment outside fixed establishments which generally suffer from deteriorated
working conditions and are more vulnerable to economic downturns(Assaad et al., 2019).
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3.1.1 Labor Law:
In 2003, a new labor law was enacted with the purpose of making firing and hiring
processes more flexible (Wahba, 2009b). By contrast, previous labor laws provided strict
employment protection. For example, dismissal for a cause under law number 137 of 1981 required
judicial approval. Moreover, employers were prohibited from terminating indefinite contracts for
economic reasons, short of permanent and complete liquidation of the firm. Definite duration
contracts could only be issued once and were automatically transformed into indefinite duration
contracts upon renewal. Both the strict employment protection provisions and ineffective
implementation of the law incentivized private firms to hire workers informally, that is, without
issuing a contract or registering them with the social insurance administration. Law 12 0f 2003
was intended to make hiring and firing in the private sector and state-owned enterprises more
flexible. The law allowed employers to renew definite duration contracts for more than one time.
This effectively meant that firms could lay off workers when their definite year contract came to
an end. As for indefinite duration contracts, they could be terminated after the approval of the
stoppage committee if employers pay severance which differed based on the length of
employment(Wahba & Assaad, 2017). Workers maintained the right to appeal this
termination(Wahba, 2009b). The law only applied to workers employed in 2004. Nonetheless,
modifications were made so that the judicial process for dismissal for cause was streamlined for
workers hired before the law came into force. (Wahba & Assaad, 2017).
Impact analyses indicate that the 2003 Law reduced the incidence of informal employment.
It is estimated that the new law “increase(d) the probability of transitioning to formal employment
for non-contractual workers employed in formal firms by about 3–3.5 percentage points, or the
equivalent of at least a fifth of informal workers in formal firms”(Wahba & Assaad, 2017).
Moreover, (Wahba, 2009b) finds the law has increased the likelihood that private non-agricultural
employees become formalized. Nonetheless, it did not have an impact on newcomers to the labor
market. The continued informalization of labor in Egypt indicates, however, that whatever impact
the law had, it was indeed meager. It may be the case that the law influenced formal firms
employing workers informally but not workers in informal firms. Considering how informal
micro-firms form the backbone of the economy, the law was unable to stop the tide of rising
informal employment.
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Apart from labor regulations flexibility, the labor law accords many protections and
entitlements to workers from which the informally employed are deprived. According to Articles
47 and 54 of the law, workers are entitled to a paid annual leave depending on the length of
employment and a paid sick leave. Articles 91 and 92 of the law give women the right to a 90-day
paid maternity leave which they receive for a maximum of two times (two births). Moreover, for
two years after birth, women are entitled to additional break time during the working day for
breastfeeding (article 93). Article 94 of the laws states that women working in establishments with
more than 50 workers have the right to request an unpaid childcare leave for a period of two years.
She can only apply for such a leave twice (two births) during her service. Similarly, per article 96
of the law, establishments with 100 or more female workers must provide child daycare.
The law also provides protections for children, such as prohibiting the employment of
children who are less than 14 years of age and specifying the number of working hours per day for
children above 14. The fifth chapter of the law deals with occupational health and safety of the
work environment. It details protections the employer or economic establishment is obliged to
offer to their workers, most importantly:
(1)

Protection against physical risks such as heat, coldness, and light

(2)

Protection against biological risks such as bacterial, viral, fungal, and parasitic

infections.
(3)

Protection against mechanical risks, that is, risks that result from a collision

between the worker’s body and a hard object
(4)

Protection against chemical risks that result from dealing with different chemical

materials
(5)

Protection against passive risks which result from the absence of certain facilities

such as ambulance services.
(6)

Protection against fire risks.

3.2 Legislative Framework:
3.2.1 Social Security Laws:
The system of pensions in Egypt was initially founded as a fully funded system. That is,
monthly contributions deducted from workers are invested in a fund that pays their pension when
it’s due. Nonetheless, it slowly moved towards a pay-as-you-go system where the current social
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security contributions pay for pension benefits. Considering how the percentage of formal
employment in Egypt has dwindled through time, the system also relies on the treasury to pay due
benefits(Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012).

Furthermore, inefficient investment strategies are

partially responsible for the unsustainability of the system (Barsoum & Selwaness, 2022). Pensions
are calculated based on a specific formula taking into consideration wage and years in service,
making it a defined benefit system. The system is presided by the National Organization for Social
Insurance (NOSI), which runs two funds that are independent of the state budget: the Government
Social Fund (GSF) for civil servants and the Public and Private Business Sector Fund (PPBSF) for
private and public sector employees, employers, the self-employed and Egyptians working abroad.
The ministry of social solidarity supervises the two funds. (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012).
Prior to the enactment of the law (149/ 2019), the social insurance system in Egypt was
governed by five different laws covering different groups of workers(International Labor
Organization, 2018):
(1) Law 79 of the year 1975 coving employees in the government and public sector and
salaried employees in the private sector
(2) Law 108 of the year 1976 covers employers and their likes.
(3) Law 50 of the year 1978 covering Egyptians working in foreign lands and those
working in the branches of international and regional organizations inside Egypt.
(4) Law 112 of the year 1980, also referred to as the total social insurance law covering
irregular workers. Article (5) of the law also provided a pension called the Sadat
pension to those who were not entitled to a pension under any of the social insurance
laws before the law was enacted.
(5) Law 90/1975 applies to the armed forces.
The new social insurance law annulled the first four insurance laws, while law 90/1975
still governs the social insurance of armed forces officers.
Law 97/1975 is the most comprehensive in terms of coverage for it covers:(International
Labor Organization, 2018)
(1) old age, disability, and survivorship: Those who have reached retirement age (60 years)
are entitled to a pension provided they have contributed for at least ten years according to the
following formula:
Pension = Settlement wage * (subscription period in months/12) *(1/45).
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The pension on the basic or variable wage, in this case, shall not be less than 50% of the
settlement wage and should not exceed 80% of the settlement wage1. This formula relates to the
general case of employees whose service ended because they reached retirement age. The formula differs
according to the case (e.g., early retirees, those who reach 60 years of age after leaving service,
survivorship).

(2) work injuries: Workers are entitled to treatment through the health insurance
organization, transportation costs, and a wage replacement equal to their full pensionable wage. In
case the work injury results in disability, the worker is entitled to an injury pension valued as a
percentage of settlement wage according to the degree of disability or a one-time compensation.
In case the disability ends the worker’s service, the worker is entitled to a disability pension
alongside the work injury pension.
(3) sickness insurance: including treatment, transportation costs, and a wage replacement
equal to 75% of pensionable wage during the first 90 days and 85% of pensionable wage during
the next 90 days. Females are entitled to 75% of pensionable wage during maternity leave provided
they have contributed to the insurance system for at least ten months.
(4) unemployment benefits: The duration of the benefits ranges from 16 to 28 weeks based
on the contribution period of the worker. The benefits are equivalent to 60% of the pensionable
wage. The unemployment benefits are not available for government employees or for workers who
are 60 years of age or above.
The contributions paid under this law were equivalent to 30% and 33% of the wage for
civil service and public enterprises, respectively, shared between the employee and the employer.
For the private sector, the contribution rate amounted to 40% of the wage shared between the
employee and the employer(Barsoum & Selwaness, 2022). The law also sets a cap on pensionable
income that increases by 10% annually (The national organization for social insurance, 2019).
Originally, the pension payable under law 12/1980 covering irregular workers was 10
pounds per month and covered only old age, disability, and survivorship as opposed to the
generous coverage of law 79/1975. (Law12/1980). In the original law, beneficiaries were required
to pay a token subscription/deductible, but in 2016, they were increased to 7% of the minimum
pensionable wage (Law 60/2016). An important source of funding for this pension is government

1

Law 97/1975 differentiates between base wage which is a fixed value paid to the worker each month, and a
variable wage including elements that vary from month to another (e.g., bonuses)(Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012)
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treasury payments. This explains why the entitlements of beneficiaries under this law are slim
compared to the 79/1975 law(International Labor Organization, 2018). Akin to law 112/1980, law
108/1976(employers’ law) covers old age, disability, and survivorship only. Nonetheless, the
contributions required are 15% of declared income (Law 108/1976).
A review of the amendments to the 79/1975 law as well as other social insurance laws in
the old system reveals a trend of periodically increasing pensions to allow pensioners to cope with
inflation and rising living expenses. For example, one of the amendments to the 79/1975 law
decreed that after calculating the pension for the basic wage, it shall be increased by 25% of its
value (Ministerial Decree 517-2009). Moreover, the total payable pension should be increased by
a sum equal to “the difference between the maximum value of the social security pension (Ma’aash
Al-Daman)2and 33% of the total pension value “(law 79/2013 amending law 79/1975 and
Ministerial Decree 126/2014) Moreover, every year the government issued a law to increase the
value of pensions (usually by 15%) for all pensioners covered by law 79/1975, law 112/1980, law
108/1976 and law 50/1978. In 2019, before the enactment of the new social insurance law, law
74/2019 set 900 pounds as the minimum pension payable under laws 79/1975, 112/1980,
108/1976, and 50/1978.
In general, commentators pointed to the following characteristics of the old social
insurance system (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012):
(1) Generational and Geographical Bias: Coverage declines with age due to reduced
government hiring and the informalization of private sector employment. It is also
biased towards urban dwellers.
(2) Regressivity: Since the law caps pensionable wage, it could be seen as a regressive tax,
requiring low-paid workers to contribute a large portion of their income while higherpaid employees pay only a small fraction of their income. This flaw incentivizes
workers to underreport their incomes and deprives the system of the higher
contributions of high-paid workers.
(3) The calculation of the settlement wage is based on the last years of service, thereby
incentivizing employees and employers to underreport their income during their service
2

Ma’ash Al-damana in a non-contributary pension received by specific groups which provides pensions
to specific target groups (orphans, widowed, divorcees, unmarried women at age 50 and above, and
families of the imprisoned). (Barsoum 2015).
24

to evade higher contributions and only report their real income around the end of their
service.
(4) Low return to contributions despite elevated contribution rates. This is partially
attributable to the fact that none of the social insurance laws automatically adjust
pensions for inflation. Instead, the government issues laws to increase pensions almost
annually.
(5) One last obstacle hindering employers and employees from participating in the social
insurance system is the high contribution cost considering the low level of wages
workers already receive. The evasion of social security contributions is facilitated by
poor low enforcement with negative repercussions on the financial sustainability of the
system(Barsoum, 2015, 2016; Sieverding, 2016).

In 2019, a new social insurance law was decreed to replace laws 79/1975, 112/1980,
108/1976, and 50/1978. Per the new law, the social insurance system is still a defined benefit
system with the option to opt into a supplementary defined contributions account. Moreover,
(NOSI) now presides over a unified fund instead of two in the old system. In order to deal with the
financial unsustainability of the social insurance scheme, the new law stipulates that insurance
fund management is the responsibility of a professional investment board presided by NOSI
instead of the treasury and the national bank of investment in the old system(Barsoum &
Selwaness, 2022). Moreover, the age of retirement is to increase gradually from 60 years to 65
years. In contrast to the old laws, the new law has an internal mechanism to periodically adjust the
value of pensions in accordance with inflation (Article 35) to deal with the problem of low returns
to contributions.
The calculation of contributions/deductibles and the pension value is based on a single
number, the total wage, which combines the base and variable wages. Notably, the new law
decreased the contributions paid by salaried workers and their employers. The rates of contribution
now amount to 28.25%,29.25%, and 29.75 of the salaries of workers in civil service, public
enterprises, and the private sector shared between the employee and employers. The reduction in
contribution rates as well as increasing the penalty over non-complying employers are intended to
incentivize registration in the new social insurance scheme.

Nonetheless, the reduced

contributions are unlikely to incentivize employers to register workers with low marginal
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productivity (the least skilled and least educated workers). At best, employers may register them
while underreporting their incomes (Barsoum & Selwaness, 2022).
On the flip side, the contributions have increased for irregular workers from 7% of the
minimum pensionable wage to 9%. In addition, they are still uncovered for the risks of sickness,
unemployment, and work injuries. The bylaw defines the groups of irregular workers that are
eligible for coverage under the new law. They form a small fraction of informal employment, in
particular, the “least paid and least educated” informal workers (Barsoum & Selwaness, 2022).
The settlement wage in the new law is the average income for all years in service instead
of the income in the last years of service. This is intended to deal with the issue of underreporting.
Nonetheless, it is doubtful that underreporting will decrease since the government has recently
increased personal income tax for higher income brackets which is likely to incentivize
underreporting for high-earning workers. Lastly, the social insurance scheme is still regressive,
given that the new law preserved the upper and lower thresholds of pensionable income(Barsoum
& Selwaness, 2022).

3.3 Active Labor Market Policies:
Active labor market policies are defined as “interventions aimed at the employment of the
most vulnerable groups in society,” including demand and supply-side policies(International
Labor Office, 2017). These policies are sought after as a solution to the high rates of
unemployment, especially youth unemployment. In the past two decades, the Egyptian
government has launched several employment strategies that were not always put into practice. A
case in point is the national youth employment program of 2001, which was spearheaded by the
information and decision support center. It had a grand goal of employing 17,000 graduates in the
public sector as well as creating 100,000 jobs in the private sector. In 2009, the youth national
employment plan was drafted by the ministry of manpower with the support of international
donors, but like its predecessor, it never materialized because of the political turmoil ensuing from
the 2011 revolution. The most recent attempt at an employment strategy came with Egypt’s
sustainable development strategy ( Egypt Vision 2030), which postulated several employment
objectives, including unemployment reduction, reforming vocational education, and making
university education responsive to labor market needs(International Labor Office, 2017).
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The policy context of ALMPS in Egypt is plagued by centralization and authoritarianism.
Moreover, employment policies tend to be politicized. That is, they are often connected to
presidential campaigns and used as a tool to preserve the legitimacy of the current regime instead
of relying on scientific evidence(International Labor Office, 2017). A tantamount to the
politicization of policies is the conviction that megaprojects are an employment policy. This has
been witnessed during the time of Mubarak in projects such as Toshka but has also been witnessed
recently in projects such as the new administrative capital(International Labor Office, 2017).
Generally, there is a lack of coordination between stakeholders. The ministry of manpower shies
away from coordinating ALMPS. Meanwhile, the existence of many donors in the field with
varying objectives and agendas inhibits the coordination of efforts (International Labor Office,
2017). The literature highlights four types of ALMPS policies in Egypt; skill training,
entrepreneurship promotion, employment services, and public employment programs (public
works).
According to the Youth Inventory Dataset, (66%) of active labor market interventions for
the youth (until 2015) were focused on skill training, about one quarter was entrepreneurship
promotion-focused, and 8% and 2% were dedicated to employment services and provision of
subsidized employment respectively. Moreover, they rarely target women (10%), youth with
disabilities (5%), and exhibit an urban bias, with nearly half of them catering to youth in urban
metropolitan areas. Civil society organizations dominate the field of ALMPS, implementing nearly
80% of interventions. A minority of these interventions are rolled out on a national scale (10%)
since CSOs lack the resources to upscale programs. (Barsoum, 2017).
State skill training programs offered by the government are presided by various
government institutions and offer hard-skill training. They generally suffer from design
inflexibility, lack of focus on skills demanded in the labor market, and non-existence of program
monitoring or evaluation. Even though donors have supported government ALMPS, the projects
they contributed to are mostly pilots. Moreover, they do not seem to focus on institutionalization,
the exception being the dual education program, providing an alternative track for completing
secondary education following the German Dual System in technical education(Barsoum, 2017).
The CSO training programs are less traditional and more in line with international best practices
as they reflect the skills demanded in the labor market, adopt integrated approaches, and make use
of computer technology to deliver courses. Moreover, they have managed to develop networks and
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partnerships among themselves, with universities and the private sector. (Barsoum, 2017). Lastly,
an important dimension of training ALMPS, on-the-job training, is still missing (International
Labor Office, 2017).
Employment offices operating under the auspices of the ministry of manpower provide
employment services. Originally, their task was to facilitate the process of hiring in the public
sector but later started to match job seekers with employment opportunities in the private sector.
These employment offices suffer from substandard infrastructure, lack of networking with the
private sector, and lack of reliance on computer technology(Barsoum, 2017). Employment services
are also offered by the private sector, such as the national employment pact, an initiative by the
German Egyptian business community and the German Arab chamber of commerce and industry
specializing in employment services for blue-collar workers. Notable non-governmental initiatives
include career and entrepreneurship development units launched by Nahdet El Mahrousa in
universities. Al Gawady nongovernmental organization also offers career counseling and has
launched a website where jobs and scholarships are posted. NGO employment services are
congruent with international best practices (forging networks with the private sector, using
technology), but there is a need for coordination between public, NGO, and private sector
initiatives in the area of employment services (International Labor Office, 2017).
Government entrepreneurship promotion services were offered primarily through the
Social Fund for Development, a quasigovernmental originally established to dampen the effects
of ERSAP on the poor (Barsoum, 2017). SFD provided financial and non-financial services to
small and micro enterprises, yet, commentators have raised concerns about the accessibility of the
loans to small businesses and the youth(International Labor Office, 2017). Apart from SDF, the
practice of providing financial services in tandem with non-financial services is still a novelty in
the Egyptian context, with some exceptions, such as the Sawiris foundation for social development
and Alexandria Business Association. Other private stakeholders include business incubators
providing non-financial support to start-ups, such as the American University in Cairo’s
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Program, providing training to youth-led startups and connecting
them to investors, Injaz Egypt, and Enactus Egypt(International Labor Office, 2017).
Apart from the specific critiques leveled against ALMPS in Egypt, the very concept and
theory underpinning ALMPS have come under attack for two main reasons; (1) global evidence
as well as evidence from MENA illustrates their failure in achieving their intended aims or, at best
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achieving meager results (Krafft & Assaad, 2015; Krafft & Rizk, 2021). (2) they are useless as
long as labor demand is low. According to this line of argument, a possible alternative is enhancing
the business environment and easing the registration and formalization burdens for small firms,
which contribute immensely to employment creation in Egypt(Krafft & Assaad, 2015).

29

4 Conceptual Framework
In this section, I examine the main conceptual and theoretical issues related to informal
employment. The first subsection discusses the definitions of the informal sector, informal
employment, and the related concept of precarious employment. The second subsection considers
the different hypotheses that were developed by economists to (1) explain the relationship between
informal employment and various variables, (2) understand the motivations of individuals to
participate in the informal sector and (3) understand the patterns of movements between different
labor market states. It also highlights the multitude of methodologies used by scholars to
prove/disprove these hypotheses.

4.1 Defining Informality:
In this subsection, I present the definitions of the informal sector and informal employment.
Even though the main question of this study is concerned with informal employment, it is not
possible to understand this concept without defining the related concept of the informal sector.
4.1.1 Informal Sector versus Informal Employment in the Informal Sector
According to the 15th International Council for Labor Statisticians, “the informal sector
is regarded as a group of production units which, according to the definitions and classifications
provided in the United Nations System of National Accounts (Rev.4), form part of the household
sector as household enterprises or, equivalently unincorporated enterprises owned by households”
(ILO,1993).
Household enterprises have the following characteristics: first, they “are not constituted as an
entity separate from its owner as are corporations” second, “they have no complete set of accounts
that would provide a means of identifying flows of income and capital between the enterprise and
the owner(s).” Third, they could be owned and operated by a single household member, more than
one member from the same household, or individuals from different households. Fourth, they must
sell some of their production on the market (ILO,1993)
Household sector enterprises could be classified into two categories (ILO,1993).
(i)

Own account enterprises (self-employed) are defined as household enterprises owned
and operated by one or more persons that do not hire paid continuous labor and may
hire unpaid family members or paid seasonal workers. The 15th ICLS resolution gave
states and their statistical agencies the option to consider all own account enterprises
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as informal or to classify as informal those own account enterprises that are not
registered.
(ii)

Enterprises of employers are defined as household enterprises that hire paid labor in a
continuous manner and may hire unpaid family members or seasonal paid labor. They
are considered informal based on one of two criteria: the number of employees or
nonregistration.

Employees in the informal sector are defined as “all persons who, during a given reference
period, were employed in at least one informal sector unit, irrespective of their status in
employment and whether it is their main or a secondary job.” Both the definitions of the informal
sector and employment in the informal sector rely on the production unit as a reference unit
(ILO,1993).
4.1.2 Informal Employment:
The definition of informal employment was introduced in the 17th ICLS guidelines concerning
a statistical definition of informal employment. The guidelines created a taxonomy of
formal/informal jobs based on two axes, as illustrated in Table (1): the type of job and the type of
the production unit. Production units are classified into three categories: formal enterprises,
informal enterprises, and households producing goods and services for their own use. Jobs are
classified into five categories; own-account workers; employers; contributing family workers;
employees; and members of producers’ cooperatives (ILO,2003).
Table 1: Categories of Formal and informal Employment
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Source:(ILO, 2013)
Based on this classification, the following categories of employment/jobs are considered
informal (ILO,2003):
1. Own-account workers (self-employed) and employers in their informal sector enterprises.
In this case, the informality of employment stems from the nature of the enterprise in which
they are employed
2. Contributing family workers who work in formal or informal enterprises. This category is
considered informally employed because usually, “their employment is not subject to labor
legislation, social security regulations, collective agreements” (ILO,2003)
3. Individuals employed in formal sector enterprises, informal sector enterprises, and paid
domestic workers are considered informal employees provided that “their employment
relationship is, in law or in practice, not subject to national labor legislation, income
taxation, social protection or entitlement to certain employment benefits (advance notice
of dismissal, severance pay, paid annual or sick leave, etc.)” (ILO,2003)
4. Members of informal producers’ cooperatives. The informality of employment stems from
the informality of the enterprise (the producer cooperative).
5. Own-account workers who produce goods for the use of their households (e.g., subsistence
farming, household member building a housing unit to live in).
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These categories of informal employment could be collapsed into three categories, employees
in the informal sector, informal employees in the formal sector, and individuals engaged in
subsistence work to produce goods for household use.
This study considers two categories of informal employment:
1. Informal salaried employees: Individuals employed in formal sector enterprises and
informal sector enterprises whose employment relationship lacks possession of a written
contract and social security. This somewhat coincides with category number three in the
previous classification
2. Self-employed: this category includes the self-employed, employers of household
enterprises, and unpaid family workers. As illustrated above, the self-employed and unpaid
family workers are considered, by definition, informal employees. However, the employers
of household enterprises are informal workers only if the enterprise they own is informal.
Given the small sample size, the study places all employers of household enterprises in this
category regardless of informality status.

4.1.3 Precarious Employment:
Precarious employment, on the other hand, could be defined in reference to the following
characteristics(International Labor Organization, 2016):
•

Low pay (worker's poverty).

•

High risk of job loss.

•

Lack of worker control, either individually or collectively, over working conditions
and wages (disempowerment)

•

Lack of protection; they are not protected under labor and social insurance laws that
accord protection against occupational risks, sickness, old age, unemployment, and
discrimination, among other risks.

It could be deduced that precarity is wider and more comprehensive compared to informal
employment. The lack of protection dimension coincides with the definition of informal
employment. Moreover, this dimension causes the other dimensions of precarity, low pay, high
risk of job loss, and disempowerment.
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Based on this definition, a recent ILO published report defines precarious employment in
Egypt in reference to the following indicators(L. Fedi, 2019):
•

working poverty

•

underemployment

•

irregular employment

•

informal work (without a contract or social insurance or health insurance)

It is noticeable that the irregular work dimension coincides with the high risk of job loss
mentioned in the previous definition, while the informal work dimension operationalizes the lack
of protection aspect of precarity. Moreover, the underemployment dimension coincides with the
lack of worker control over working conditions.

4.2 Informal employment: Hypotheses and Methodologies
In this subsection, I discuss the main hypotheses developed by scholars to explain how
informal employment relates to other variables, namely, trade liberalization and labor market
regulations. I also discuss the two competing hypotheses about the motivations of individuals to
participate in the informal sector. Moreover, I examine the relationship between gender and
informal employment. Lastly, I present the hypotheses that predict the patterns of mobility of
different groups between labor market states. Throughout the section, I summarize the main
methodologies used by scholars to prove/disprove these hypotheses.
4.2.1 Labor Market Regulations:
There are two competing hypotheses regarding the impact of labor regulation; The distortionist
perspective argues against labor market regulations because they “introduce distortions that
misallocate labor; waste resources through rent-seeking, impede adjustments to economic shocks,
discourage hiring and favor “insiders” (such as regular workers or males) and therefore reduce
growth.” The “institutionalist” perspective, on the other hand, argues that labor market regulations
offer indispensable protection for the poor from the impacts of market failures. (Wahba & Assaad,
2017).
To determine the impact of labor market regulations on informal employment, economists
exploited regional variation in labor market regulations. For example, (Besley & Burgess, 2004)
coded amendments to the industrial disputes act, which organizes the settlement of disputes
between workers and employers and hiring and firing regulations into “pro-worker,” “pro34

employer,” or “neutral” Enacted in 1947, the law has been amended by state governments
extensively which means that each state has a somewhat different version of the law. This is used
as their independent variable, which they regression on several dependent variables measuring the
size of formal and informal sectors.
While the previous studies on India exploit the federal nature of the state that creates statelevel variation in the implementation of laws and regulations, studies of Egypt exploit the
enactment of a new labor law on a national scale to account for the impact of labor market
flexibilization on informal employment. In this regard, (Wahba, 2009) estimates probit and
proportional hazard models to model the effect of the new labor law on an individual’s probability
of obtaining a formal private sector job using two waves of a panel survey, one conducted before
the enactment of the law and the second after the law came into force. (Wahba & Assaad, 2017)
on the other hand, employ a difference in differences methodology to gauge the effect of rolling
out the new law using workers in informal enterprises as a comparison group. Researchers have
also resorted to different variations of the search and matching labor market models taking account
of the different characteristics of labor markets in developing countries, such as the existence of a
sizeable public sector(Bosch & Esteban-Pretel, 2012; Yassin & Langot, 2018).

4.2.2 Informal Employment and Trade liberalization:
According to the literature, trade liberalization is an important macro driver of informal
employment. However, there are two main hypotheses regarding the direction of this relationship.
The first hypothesis posits that trade liberalization increases competition from foreign products
and consequently forces low-productivity informal enterprises out of the market. Trade
liberalization also encourages some firms to formalize their operations(Selwaness & Zaki, 2015).
The second hypothesis, which stands in juxtaposition to the first one, claims that the heightened
competition unleashed by trade liberalization incentivizes firms to reduce production costs to
increase their competitiveness. This can be achieved by hiring more informal employees, laying
off employees (which subsequently forces them to join the ranks of the informal sector), and
outsourcing tasks to informal enterprises(Selwaness & Zaki, 2015).
One approach to determine the impact of trade liberalization on informality is to regress
the probability of informal employment on import tariffs at the level of the industry directly(Ben
Yahmed & Bombarda, 2020; Paz, 2014). Another approach is a two-step regression estimation. In
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the first step, the probability of being an informal employee is regressed over a number of
household, individual, regional, and industry variables using panel data. The coefficient of the
industry variable, which represents the “informality premium,” is then regressed over import tariffs
at the level of the industry in the second step of the analysis(Salem & Zaki, 2019; Selwaness &
Zaki, 2015). A third approach takes regions or micro-regions as the unit of analysis through a twostep analysis. In the first step, the probability of informal employment is regressed over individual
and micro-region characteristics. The regression is run for each region separately. These regional
estimates are then used as the dependent variables in the second step and regressed over regional
tariff levels and other controls(Ponczek & Ulyssea, 2021).

4.2.3 Motivations of Informal Workers: Segmentation vs. Integrated Market Explanations
Labor market segmentation theorists argue the labor market is split into two sub-markets:
a formal one with favorable jobs (e.g., higher wages, social protection, and good working
conditions) and an informal one with less favorable jobs. In a labor market segmented along the
formal/informal divide, workers are forced into the informal sector because of barriers to entry
into the formal sector (e.g., minimum wage enforced by the government in the formal sector, which
reduces labor demand). This means that the informal sector is a survivalist sector or a sector of last
resort. In a competitive/integrated labor market, by contrast, workers choose to join the ranks of
the informal sector voluntarily because they have a comparative advantage in that sector and
because it offers many non-wage benefits to workers, such as flexibility in working hours which
is especially valued by married women and mothers. This doesn’t mean that workers in the
informal sector are well off or that they are not poor. Instead, it means they will not be better off
if they join the ranks of the formal sector. A third view claims the informal sector is a
heterogeneous field that includes workers who are rationed out of formal employment as well as
ones who are in the sector because they have a comparative advantage in informal jobs and enjoy
the non-wage benefits it offers(Maloney & Arias, 2007). Scholars used a myriad of methodologies
to gauge the extent of labor market segmentation. They can generally be classified into three
categories: (1) calculating transition probabilities, (2) estimating finite mixture models, and (3)
estimating the formal/informal wage gap.
A practical implication of labor market segmentation is that the flows from the informal to
the formal sector are higher than the flows in the other ways around, which indicates that workers
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enter the informal sector and queue in it until they manage to find a position in the formal sector.
Because relying on raw conditional transition probabilities can yield misleading results, scholars
developed their own measures of transitions between sectors. For example, (Bosch & Maloney,
2010) developed the C- Statistic which represents "worker's h probability of transitioning from
sector k to I over his/her probability of leaving sector k relative to the analogous ratio for all the
sectors” They argue that this measure is akin to the revealed comparative advantage in the trade
literature in that it reflects the comparative advantage of workers.
Likewise, (Pagés & Stampini, 2009) developed a “benchmark mobility indicator”
measuring “ the degree of mobility that should occur in a world in which all states are equally
preferred – in utility terms- and all workers who left their initial position have an equal probability
of ending up in a given labor market state regardless of their previous employment history.” In
another paper, (Bernabè & Stampini, 2009) devise “cleaned” measure of transition tendencies that
captures “the probability of transiting from status I to j that account for the share of jobs destroyed
by status I, and for the share of jobs created in each status of possible destination, that is, all but I”
The second method of gauging the existence of labor market segmentation is estimating
the wage gap between the formal and informal sectors (the informal sector penalty). Barriers to
entry exist if there is a wage gap between equally endowed individuals in the formal and informal
sectors. By using OLS and Quantile regressions with fixed effects, it is possible to determine the
wage gap between the two sectors while taking time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity into
account. The use of quantile regressions also allows for quantifying the gap along with the income
distribution. This methodology requires the existence of panel data which may be unavailable for
some developing countries.
According to (Günther & Launov, 2012), entry barriers exist if the workers are underrepresented in the sector that maximizes their wages given their level of human capital. Using
finite mixture models, they estimate the distribution of workers in the different labor market
segments under the competitive labor market assumption (i.e., that workers are found in that
segment of the labor market that maximizes their income given their level of human capital). This
counterfactual distribution is then compared to the actual worker distribution in the labor market.
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4.2.4 Gender and Informality:
A key area of research in this section is understanding how and why the gender wage gap varies
between the formal and informal sectors. Theoretically, there are three explanations for why the
gender wage gap should vary between the formal and informal sectors:
(1) Observed and unobserved heterogeneity in worker characteristics.
(2) Compensating wage Differentials: Each of the sectors (formal/informal) provides different
types of amenities that are preferred or valued differently by males and females. If women
in the formal sector prefer paid leave more than men in the same sector, then they will be
open to receiving lower wages compared to men in exchange for the paid leave, thereby
creating a gender wage gap in the formal sector only. If, on the other hand, women in the
informal sector place a higher value on flexibility compared to men, they will be open to
accepting a lower wage in exchange for flexibility which will create a gender wage gap in
the informal sector only.
(3) Labor Regulation and Discrimination: In the formal sector, employers are incentivized to
pay lower wages to women even though they have identical characteristics to men because
the latter's market attachment is affected by childbirth. Employers who employ women
formally incur costs due to labor discontinuity of women (mandated by maternity leaves
and job protection regulations) and compensate for it by awarding them with lower wages.
These amenities are not offered in the informal sector and hence do not contribute to the
gender wage gap in it.
Two main methods can be used to decompose the gender wage gap in the formal and informal
sectors: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition techniques and OLS and Quantile regressions with fixed
effects. Both methodologies allow for the decomposition of the wage gap into two parts; the first
part of the gap represents the differences in wages due to differences in observable characteristics
(e.g., educational attainment). Interestingly, studies differ in interpreting the meaning of the second
component of the gap; while some studies refer to it as the differences in wages attributable to
unobserved heterogeneity, other studies interpret it as the discrimination component of the gender
wage gap.
4.2.5 Predicting Transition Probabilities of Different Groups of Workers:
Another concern for researchers was understanding the determinants of informal employment
as well as the determinants of transitions between different labor market states, including but not
38

limited to formal and informal labor market states. In answer to the first question, researchers used
logit, probit, and multinomial logistic regressions depending on the number of categories in their
dependent variable. In answer to the second question, they tended to rely on multinomial logistic
regressions. Analyses of labor market transitions are dynamic and provide information about labor
mobility of different demographic groups that are not captured by a snapshot of the labor market.
They also give an indication of which demographic groups are likely to fall into undesirable or
unprotected labor market states, which could be extremely beneficial in the design of employment
and social protection policies. Different variables affect the transition probabilities of workers
differently, to which we turn in the following paragraphs.
4.2.5.1

Age:

Younger age groups are likely to have high rates of informal salaried employment. “Because
of information asymmetries, young workers without a track record may find formal employers
reluctant to hire them and hence may queue in the informal sector while they gain experience.”
(Maloney & Arias, 2007). As workers grow, their likelihood of moving from informal to formal
salaried work is likely to increase. Older salaried workers may decide instead to move into selfemployment, having gained capital and experience. The concentration of the younger age groups
in informal salaried employment and the older age groups in self-employment prompts Ulyssea to
note that “It has been extensively documented that the incidence of informal employment displays
a U-shape pattern with respect to age (it is larger among younger and older workers) …..transitions
in and out of informality follow a similar pattern to that observed for the stock of informal
employment”(Ulyssea, 2020).
4.2.5.2

Education

Both human capital theory and signaling theory focus on the impact of education on labor
market outcomes. The first posits that education and experience increase the productivity of
workers, while the second argues that education gives a signal to prospective employers about the
level of productivity of workers(Tan, 2014); hence we should expect to find workers with higher
levels of education moving into more favorable employment states and less likely to fall into
undesirable labor market states.
However, the youth may also queue in unemployment in the presence of large government
sectors and anemic formal private sectors. Assaad develops a simple theoretical model on the lines
of the Todaro-Harris model where the government wage and non-wage benefits exceed marketclearing prices resulting in the queuing of workers eligible for the government positions in
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unemployment. Per this model, the unemployed youth would be more likely compared to the less
educated to move from unemployment towards government or formal employment and less likely
to move into any other inferior labor market state. (Assaad, 2014).

4.2.5.3

Social Class:

It is also crucial to understand the role played by social class in determining labor market
outcomes. Individuals who have equal educational attainment but belong to different social classes
may face a gap in labor market outcomes, otherwise known as the social origin gap. The social
origin gap refers to " the advantage that subjects of the upper-class experience for occupational
attainment and income compared with subjects of the lower class at the same level of education"
several mechanisms of action underpin the social origins gap. For one thing, it is possible for
individuals of high social and economic standing to benefit from the economic resources of their
parents. For instance, it may provide much-needed capital to kickstart a business or pay tuition
fees. Additionally, a good social background translates into better social networks that provide
individuals with information about vacancies or gives them an edge in the hiring process. It is also
possible that individuals

from

lower social classes

are discriminated against

by

employers(Bernardi & Gil-Hernández, 2021). For all these reasons, it is expected that higher social
class will facilitate transitions to more favorable labor market states and protect against
unfavorable transitions.

4.2.5.4

Gender:

In many developing countries, women are overrepresented in informal employment or are
more likely to transition into it (Danquah et al., 2019; Maloney & Arias, 2007; Ulyssea, 2020).
Human capital theory would explain this trend by differences in human capital between men and
women. Another explanation highlights the voluntary nature of female participation in informal
employment: since workers weigh the costs and benefits of different forms of employment,
married women may decide to join the informal sector because they value the flexibility it offers
and because it allows them to balance life and work responsibilities(Maloney & Arias, 2007). A
third explanation is the discrimination from employers in formal firms against women (Ben
Yahmed, 2018). On the flipside, MENA countries, including Egypt, face high levels of female
unemployment and inactivity despite rising levels of educational attainment, otherwise known as
the MENA paradox(Assaad et al., 2020). There are multiple explanations for this phenomenon.
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On the demand side, high female unemployment and economic inactivity in the region are
explained by the changing opportunity structure available to women after downsizing the
government and public sector that started in the 1990s (Assaad et al., 2020). On the supply side,
cultural norms that confine women to performing domestic and care activities could be responsible
for female inactivity. (Hendy, 2015). Another related supply-side explanation highlights how
women and their families tend to have “reservation working conditions” and will be unwilling to
take on jobs with poor working conditions ( such as informal jobs) for fear of sexual harassment
and tarnishing the reputation of the female worker. (Krafft & Assaad, 2015).
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5 Data and Methodology:
In this study, I employ a quantitative methodology to test the relationship between
transitions from one labor market state to another and a set of micro-determinants. The
methodology section is divided into a data section describing the data used in this study and an
empirical model section.

5.1 Data:
In this study, I will rely on the Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS)2012 and
2018 rounds. The ELMPS is a longitudinal survey conducted by the Economic Research Forum
(ERF) and the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). There are
currently four waves of the survey conducted in 1998, 2006,2012, and 2018. The first round of
ELMPS was a two-stage stratified national sample chosen from a master sample made by
CAPMAS (Assaad & Krafft,2013). Subsequent rounds of ELMPS tracked households that were
interviewed in previous waves and interviewed all their members, including new members and
members who had been interviewed in previous waves. Moreover, they tracked household
members that have split and formed/joined new households and reinterviewed them as well as
interviewing other members of the newly formed households. A refresher sample ranging from
2000 to 3000 households is added in each wave of the survey in order to sustain sample
representativeness and to provide a fine-grained analysis of a particular phenomenon of interest.
For instance, in the latest wave of the survey, the refresher sample consisted of 2000 households
oversampled from the poorest villages in Egypt in order to discover the topic of the economic
vulnerability of the poor in more detail (Krafft, Assaad & Rahman,2019).
The ELMPS questions cover a wide array of topics, including employment status and
characteristics, wages, education, parent’s education, housing, services, residential mobility,
migration, remittances, and female empowerment. In addition, the survey includes a number of
retrospective questions. For example, some questions are about jobs that the interviewees held in
the last six years and their characteristics (e.g., possession of contract and social insurance) (Krafft,
Assaad & Rahman,2019). In this study, I focus on the subsample of individuals who were
interviewed in 2012 and reinterviewed in 2018. Moreover, the analysis is restricted to individuals
aged 15-64 in 2012.
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5.2 Methodology
5.2.1

Transition Matrices
Before estimating the determinants of labor market transitions, the probabilities of flows

from one labor market state to another are estimated as follows:
Psi = Nsi /Ns
Where:
Psi is the probability of an individual transitioning to labor market state (i) in 2018, provided that
they were at labor market state (s) in 2012.
Nsi is the number of transitions from state (s) to state (i) between 2012 and 2018
Ns is the total number of transitions from state (s) between 2012 and 2018
Transition matrices are calculated for the whole sample as well as for men and women
separately to understand the gendered nature of transitions.
5.2.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression Models
In this study, I use multinomial logistic regression to model the determinants of transition
from one labor market state to another. Multinomial Logistic regression (MNL) is used when the
dependent variable is a categorical variable with k categories, and these categories are unordered.
The dependent variable in this study is the labor market status in 2018, which is a categorical
variable composed of the following four categories3:
(1) Formal salaried employment refers to salaried workers in the government, public or

private sector who possess either a contract or social insurance.
(2) Informal salaried employment refers to salaried employees in government, public or

private sector who possess neither social insurance nor a contract.
(3) Self-employed consists of the self‐employed, unpaid family workers, and employers.
(4) Non-employed: refers to individuals with no job but are searching actively for one

(unemployed) as well as the Out of Labor Force; those who do not have a job and are
not searching for one.

3

A market definition of employment is used.
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The specification of the dependent variables allows for focusing on the most important
transitions (between formal, informal salaried, and self-employment) without fragmenting the
analysis. Moreover, specifying more labor market states led to computational difficulties given the
small sample size and using many categorical independent variables.
In order to study the impact of the explanatory variables on labor market transitions, the
sample is divided into four subsamples based on the labor market state in 2012; the formal salaried,
informal salaried, self-employed and non-employed, and a multinomial logistic regression is run
separately for each subsample with a total of four MNL models. Hence, for each individual, there
are three possible market state transitions in addition to immobility (remaining in the same market
state between 2012 and 2018).
For each one of the four MNL models, there are k-1 equations. Each equation estimates the
log odds of transition to one category of the dependent variables compared to the reference
category (immobility) given several independent variables as follows:
Log(P(Y=1|X)/P(Y=K|X)) = a1 +b1x
Log(P(Y=2|X)/P(Y=K|X)) = a2 +b2x

….
Log(P(Y=K-1|X)/P(Y=K|X)) = aK-1 +bK-1 x

Where:

Y is the categorical dependent variable which is the employment status in 2018.
X is a set of independent variables pertaining to the year 2012
K is the reference category, and a is constant
b is a coefficient that measures the change in the odds of Y = 1 compared to Y=k given one unit
change in X
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Given that the interpretation of the coefficients of MNL models is not straightforward,
average marginal effects will be reported, which represent the change in Y given one unit change
in X.
The independent variables used in the four regression models are listed in Table (2). The values
of these variables are for the year 2012. The independent variables of interest are age, education,
father’s level of education, gender, and area of residence. Other controls included in the four
models are marital status and household size.

Table 2: Independent Variables

Variable

Definition

Type

1. Gender

Gender of the individual; male or female

Categorical

2. Age

This variable consists of three categories; individuals aged between

Categorical

15 and 24, those aged 25 to 44, and individuals aged
45 to 64

3. Marital
Status

A dummy variable consisting of the following categories: married,
not married
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Categorical

4. Household

Number of household members

Discrete

5. Educational
attainment

A variable measuring educational attainment consisting of the
following categories: Illiterate or read and write, less than
intermediate education, intermediate education and above,
university education and above

Categorical

6. Social class

Father’s education is a proxy for social class. It consists of the
following categories: Illiterate or read and write, less than
intermediate education, intermediate education and above,
university education and above

Categorical

7. Residence

Area of residence; urban or rural

Categorical

Size
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5.2.3 Study Limitations:
The original aim was to include all the independent variables in (Tansel & Ozdemir, 2019),
but it was not possible for two main reasons: First, a large number of missing observations was
detected in some of the variables. Figure (1) illustrates the high percentage of missing data in
activity_12, which is the variable for the sector of employment, wexp_12(work experience), and
employment_status_18, the dependent variable. Second, because of the small sample size, it was
not possible to include interactions between some of the variables, especially since many of the
independent variables are categorical. Including interactions resulted in the non-convergence of
the model. One last limitation of this study is not accounting for the economic shock caused by the
2016 reforms over labor market transitions. The 2016 economic reforms implemented by the
government must have had a profound impact on the labor market in Egypt. It could have the effect
of increasing the transitions towards undesirable labor market states such as informal salaried jobs,
especially for the most vulnerable groups in society, such as the least educated. Its impact should
be incorporated into model estimation in future studies, considering how the ELMPS includes a
historical data module listing the previous jobs of the individual and whether or not he/she had a
contract/social security in these jobs.
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Figure 1: % of Missing Data in Model Variables

Source: Constructed by the author using ELMPS2012,2018
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6 Empirical Results:
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
6.1.1 Transition Matrices:
Table 1: Transition Probability Matrix - Total Sample
Employment status in 2012

Employment Status in 2018
Formal

Informal Salaried Self Employed

Non-employed

Salaried
Formal Salaried

72.3

12.0

3.8

11.9

Informal Salaried

13.2

59.0

16.6

11.1

Self Employed

5.6

27.2

46.1

21.1

Non-employed

4.7

10.0

7.4

77.9

Source: Constructed by the author using data from ELMPS 2012,2018
The transition matrix for the total sample indicates that most individuals in a given labor
market state in 2012 remained in that state in 2018. This pattern is more noticeable in the case of
formal salaried workers in 2012, as they have nearly a 70% chance of remaining in the same labor
market state in 2018. A similar pattern is noticeable for the non-employed in 2012, who are more
likely to remain non-employed in 2018 with a probability of approximately 78%. The persistence
of non-employment may be driven by individuals queuing in unemployment until they manage to
find a formal position. The informally employed and self-employed in 2012 largely remained in
their respective labor market states in 2018 with probabilities of 59% and 46%, respectively;
however, their transition rates towards other labor market states are higher compared to the formal
salaried and the non-employed. This is consistent with the flexibility that characterizes these labor
market states. There also seems to be some oscillation between informal salaried work and selfemployment as well as the other way around. A worrying trend is that the self-employed in 2012
have a relatively high probability of moving into non-employment. This may be driven by
retirement or failing to succeed in entrepreneurial activity and consequently becoming
unemployed.
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All in all, this transition matrix indicates a high degree of stability and labor market state
dependence. That is, those in a certain labor market state are more likely to remain in that state in
the future than to make a transition to another state. As informative as this matrix is, it may conceal
gendered trends in the labor market, to which we move in the coming paragraphs.
Table 2: Transition Probability Matrix-Females
Employment status in 2012

Employment Status in 2018
Formal Salaried

Informal Salaried Self Employed Non-employed

Formal Salaried

76.7

4.5

0.6

18.2

Informal Salaried

12.8

25.6

5.4

56.2

Self Employed

0.9

4.0

28.3

66.8

Non-employed

2.5

3.3

6.0

88.1

Source: Constructed by the author using data from ELMPS 2012,2018.
A glaring trend in the females-only transition matrix is the higher likelihood of transiting
from other labor market states to non-employment, as well as the persistence of non-employment.
Women in informal salaried work in 2012 have a 56% probability of moving into nonemployment, while women in self-employment have a 67% likelihood of becoming nonemployed. Those in non-employment have an 88% probability of remaining in that state. An
exception is the formally salaried in 2012 who are more likely to remain in formal salaried work
with nearly a 77% probability. This is likely driven by stable government employment that tends
to hire women disproportionately and allows them to reconcile work and domestic duties. The
second highest transition probability for the self-employed and informal salaried women is
remaining in their respective states. The second highest transition probability for the formal
salaried is by contrast towards non-employment. In general, females are most likely to move from
other labor market states to non-employment except for the formally salaried. Several explanations
have been advanced by scholars to explain high rates of female unemployment and inactivity, to
which we turn in the regression results section.
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Table 3: Transition Probability Matrix - Males only
Employment status in
2012

Employment Status in 2018
Formal Salaried Informal

Self Employed Non-employed

Salaried
Formal Salaried

70.6

14.9

5.1

9.5

Informal Salaried

13.3

61.0

17.3

8.4

Self Employed

7.1

34.6

51.9

6.5

Non-employed

13.8

38.1

13.2

35.0

Source: Constructed by the author using data from ELMPS 2012,2018.
As for the males-only matrix, the pattern of transitions reflects a labor market state
dependency akin to that of the total sample matrix except for the non-employed. Those who were
formally salaried in 2012 have approximately a 71% probability of remaining in the same labor
market state, while those in informal salaried work are most likely to remain in the same labor
market state with a 61% probability. The same pattern holds for the self-employed (52%). For
those who were non-employed in 2012, the highest probability of transition is towards informal
employment (nearly 38%), followed by remaining in non-employment (35%). This may reflect the
prevalent gender norms where men cannot afford to stay unemployed/out of the labor force and
must pursue a job even if that means resorting to the informal sector. Women, by contrast, would
only accept a job if it were in the formal sector, most likely a government job. Figure (3) provides
a graphical depiction of the transition probability matrices discussed above.
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Figure 2: Transition Probability Matrix
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6.1.2 Model Variables:
Table 4: Distribution of Labor Market States in 2012 by Gender
Variable

Sex

Total

Female

Male

1,510 (5.0%)

3,974 (13%)

5,484 (18%)

Informal Salaried

287 (1.0%)

4,406 (15%)

4,693 (16%)

Self Employed

881 (2.9%)

3,024 (10%)

3,905 (13%)

Non-employed

12,457 (41%)

3,230 (11%)

15,687 (52%)

82 (0.3%)

214 (0.7%)

296 (1.0%)

15,217 (51%)

14,848 (49%)

30,065 (100%)

Labor Market State in 2012
Formal Salaried

Missing
Total

Source: Constructed by the author using data from ELMPS 2012.
Tables (4) and (5) present the distribution of labor market states in 2012 and 2018. The
dependent variable is the labor market state in 2018. The distribution of labor market states in 2012
indicates that the most common labor market state was non-employment (52%). Moreover, the
percentages of formal and informal salaried are on par with one another at 18% and 16%
respectively. The least recurrent labor market state in the year is self-employment (13%).
Disaggregation by sex shows that men have higher representation in all labor market states
compared to women, except for non-employment, in which women are overrepresented. The
distribution of labor market states in 2018 exhibits similar patterns. That is, non-employment is
the most recurrent labor market state (35%), followed by formal salaried workers (14%), informal
salaried (15%), and self-employed (10%). Disaggregation by sex also shows that men are
overrepresented in all labor market states except for non-employment, in which women are
overrepresented. These gendered patterns confirm the findings from the transition matrices. One
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last thing to note is the high percentage of missing observations in 2018 (26%) compared to 2012
(1%).

Table 5: Distribution of Labor Market States in 2018 by Gender
Variable

Sex

Total

Female

Male

1,098 (3.7%)

2,969 (9.9%)

4,067 (14%)

Informal Salaried

440 (1.5%)

4,164 (14%)

4,604 (15%)

Self Employed

787 (2.6%)

2,244 (7.5%)

3,031 (10%)

Non-employed

8,981 (30%)

1,509 (5.0%)

10,490 (35%)

Missing

3,911 (13%)

3,962 (13%)

7,873 (26%)

15,217 (51%)

14,848 (49%)

30,065 (100%)

Labor Market State in 2018
Formal Salaried

Total

Source: Constructed by the author using data from ELMPS 2018.
Table (6) presents the independent variables in the model. Regarding age, 47% of the
sample falls between 25-44 years, 30% fall between 15-24 years, and 23% are between 45-64 years
of age. Moving on to the educational attainment of individuals, it is noticeable that most of the
sample has an intermediate certificate or above (37%), followed by illiterate to read and write
(27%), less than intermediate (22%), and finally those with a university certificate amounted to
14% of the sample. Further, 45% of the sample reside in urban areas, while 55% reside in rural
areas. The sample has almost equal proportions of males (49%) and females (51%). Two-thirds of
the sample are married, while the remainder is unmarried. Regarding the father’s level of
education, which is a proxy for social class, more than two-thirds of the sample have a father who
is either illiterate or can read and write (69%), 12% have a less than intermediate certificate, 12%
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have an intermediate certificate or above and nearly 7% university education or above. Finally,
the mean household size is approximately 5, with a standard deviation of 2.17.
Table 6: Independent Variables in the Model
Variable

N = 30,065
Number (%)
Mean (SD)

Age
15-24

9,052 (30%)

25-44

13,997 (47%)

45-64

7,016 (23%)

Educational Attainment
Illiterate/Read&Write

8,135 (27%)

Less than Intermediate

6,567 (22%)

Intermediate and above

10,987 (37%)

University

4,341 (14%)

Missing
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Residence
Rural

16,441 (55%)

Urban

13,624 (45%)
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Gender
Female

15,217 (51%)

Male

14,848 (49%)

Marital Status
Married

19,863 (66%)

Not married

10,202 (34%)

Father's Educational Attainment
Illiterate/read&write

20,760 (69%)

Less than Intermediate

3,560 (12%)

Intermediate and above

3,669 (12%)

University & above

2,074 (6.9%)

Missing

2

Household Size

4.83 (2.17)

Source: Constructed by the author from ELMPS 2012

We now move to the analysis of labor market states in 2012 and 2018 stratified by the
values of the main independent variables. In both years, the likelihood of being in formal
employment increases with educational attainment. For example, in 2018, the percentage of
university graduates in formal employment was 42%, compared to 4% in the lowest educational
category. The likelihood of being in informal employment is lower for the university graduates
compared to the illiterate/read or write (13%,22% in 2018). Self-employment also consistently
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decreases with educational level. Moreover, non-employment is higher for the base category
compared to university graduates.
Figure 3: Employment Status by educational Level
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The overwhelming majority of women are non-employed (unemployed or economically
inactive). The likelihood of being non-employed is higher for women compared to men (84%
compared to 24% in 2018). The second most recurrent labor market state for women is formal
employment, most likely in the government/public sector. However, the odds of being in formal
salaried employment are higher for men compared to women. Furthermore, the odds of being in
informal salaried employment are higher for men compared to women. In fact, informal salaried
employment is the most recurrent employment category for men in both years. (30%,37% in 20122018 respectively).
Figure 4: employment Status by Sex

The incidence of formal employment and non-employment increases with the father’s level
of education. For instance, the likelihood of being in formal employment is 13% for the base
category and 23% for those with university certificates in 2018. On the other hand, the likelihood
of non-employment in 2018 increases from 51% for the lowest educational category to 63% for
university graduates. The latter result indicates that those belonging to a higher social class can
afford to remain non-employed until they find a suitable position. Moreover, the likelihood of
being in informal salaried employment or self-employment decreases with the educational level of
the father.

58

Figure 5: Employment Status by Father's level of education

The likelihood of being in non-employment is the same for urban and rural areas. However,
the percentage of formal employment is higher in urban compared to rural areas. By contrast, the
percentages of individuals in self-employment and informal employment are somewhat higher in
rural areas compared to urban areas.

Figure 6: Employment Status by Area of Residence
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Moving on to age, the likelihood of non-employment is highest for the youngest age group
(75% and 78% in 2012 and 2018, respectively). By contrast, formal employment is lowest for this
age group (3% and 2% for 2012 and 2018, respectively). Moreover, self-employment seems to
increase with age. Informal employment is highest for those of prime age (21% and 26% in 2012
and 2018, respectively).

Figure 7: Employment Status by Age Group

60

6.2 Findings:
6.2.1 Transitions from Formal Salaried Employment:
6.2.1.1

From Formal Salaried to Informal Salaried:

The results indicate that being male increases the probability of making this transition
compared to being female by nearly 9%. Moreover, educational attainment is protective against
transitions from formal to informal waged employment. The protective effect is higher for those
with intermediate and above education and university education. Being older in age (25-44 or 4564) reduces the likelihood of this transition compared to being 15-24. Being between 25 and 44
reduces the likelihood of making this transition by nearly 5% compared to the reference category,
while being between 45-64 reduces the likelihood by nearly 14%. The unmarried were 9% more
likely to make a transition from formal to informal salaried compared to the married. Moving on
to household size, one unit increase in household size is associated with an average of 10%
decrease in the likelihood of making this transition. Lastly, an individual whose father has a
university or above education is 5% less likely to move from formal to informal waged
employment.
6.2.1.2

Transitions from formal salaried to self-employed.

For this transition, the results indicate that being a female is protective against the transition
from formal salaried to self-employed compared to being a male. Moreover, having an
intermediate or above or university education is associated with a reduced probability of
transitioning to self-employment compared to the reference group. Individuals whose fathers have
less than an intermediate level of education are less likely to transition from formal employment
to self-employment.
6.2.1.3

Transitions from formal salaried to non-employment

Unlike previous transitions, being male is protective against the transition from formal
waged employment to non-employment compared to being female. Moreover, having an
intermediate and above education reduces the likelihood of transitions to non-employment
compared to the reference category in all specifications except the third one. Holding an
intermediate or above degree reduces the likelihood of transition to non-employment by nearly 4%
in the full model. As for the university level of education, it is only statistically significant in one
specification and is not statistically significant in the full model. Moreover, the results indicate that
being between 25 and 44 years old is protective against this transition compared to the reference
category, while being in the older age group of 45 to 64 increases the likelihood of transition to
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non-employment compared to the reference group. This might be driven by people retiring and
becoming out of the labor force rather than becoming unemployed. As for the residence variable,
living in an urban area increases the likelihood of transitioning to non-employment compared to a
rural area by 4%. Additionally, the unmarried are more likely to transition from formal waged
employment to non-employment compared to the married by nearly 3%. Lastly, those living in a
larger household are less likely to transition to nonemployment.
6.2.2 Transitions from informal employment
6.2.2.1

Transitions from informal employment to formal salaried

Higher educational attainment is associated with a higher probability of making this
transition. It is also noticeable that the magnitude of the marginal effects increases with the level
of education. For example, having a less than intermediate certificate raises the likelihood of this
transition by nearly 5% compared to the reference category, while having a university certificate
increases the likelihood by nearly 24% compared to the reference category. Moreover, being
between 25 and 44 years of age increases the likelihood of making this transition by nearly 6%
compared to the reference category. Moreover, living in an urban area increases the likelihood of
moving from informal to formal employment by nearly 3% compared to rural area residents.
Lastly, those whose father has intermediate or above certificate are more likely to make this
transition compared to the reference category by 7%
6.2.2.2

Transitions from informal salaried to self-employed

Being male increases the likelihood of this transition by nearly 12% compared to being
female. Moreover, having less than intermediate education is protective against this transition,
while the intermediate and above level is significant in some specifications only and not in the full
model. Being between 25 and 44 years of age and between 45 and 64 years of age increases the
likelihood of this transition compared to the reference category, but the results are not statistically
significant in the full model. Furthermore, the unmarried are less likely compared to the married
to make this transition towards self-employment, while those with larger households are more
likely to make this transition; nonetheless, the magnitude of the marginal effects for the household
size variable is meager.
6.2.2.3

From informal salaried to non-employment

It is noticeable that being male reduces the probability of making this transition by an
alarming 47%. Moreover, having less than intermediate education increases the likelihood of this
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transition compared to the reference category by nearly 4%. Being between 25 and 44 of age
reduces the probability of this transition by nearly 4% compared to the reference group, while
being between 45 -64 increases the probability by nearly 12%. Living in an urban area is associated
with higher odds of moving from informal waged employment to non-employment, but the results
are not statistically significant in the full model. Finally, unmarried individuals are more likely to
make this transition compared to married individuals by nearly 4%.
6.2.3 Transitions from self-employment
6.2.3.1

From self-employment to formal salaried

The results indicate that being male increases the probability of this transition by nearly
5% compared to being female. Moreover, those with university or intermediate and above
education are more likely to make this transition compared to the reference category noting that
the magnitude of the marginal effect doubles (4% for the intermediate and above compared to 8%
for those with university education).
6.2.3.2

Transitions from self-employment to informal salaried

As expected, males are more likely to move from self-employment to informal waged
employment compared to women by nearly 31%. Moreover, having a university degree reduces
the probability of this transition by 10% compared to the reference group, while holding an
intermediate or above certificate reduces the probability by nearly 4%. Additionally, being
between 25-44 and 45-64 reduces the likelihood of making this transition by 8% and 26%,
respectively, compared to the reference category. The unmarried are more likely to move from
self-employment to formal wage employment by about 5% compared to the married. Lastly,
having a father with intermediate and above or university and above education reduces the
likelihood of this transition by 6% and 12%, respectively, compared to the reference group.
6.2.3.3

Transitions from self-employment to non-employment

Males are less likely than females to make this transition by 61%. Additionally, those with
less than intermediate education are more likely to make this transition by 5% compared to the
reference category. Lastly, those between 25-44 years of age are less likely compared to those
between 15 and 24 years of age to transition from self-employment to non-employment by about
6%.
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6.2.3.4 Transitions from non-employment
6.2.3.4.1 Transitions from non-employment to formal salaried.

Males are more likely than women to make this transition by about 6%. Additionally,
Higher educational attainment is associated with a higher probability of transitioning to formal
employment, and the effect of education increases with the certificate earned. Those who live in
urban areas are more likely than those who live in rural areas to transition to formal salaried by
about 1%. Furthermore, the unmarried are more likely than the married to make this transition by
3%. Higher levels of father’s education are associated with a higher likelihood of transitioning to
formal salaried only for individuals whose father has intermediate and above or university and
above education. The results for the age variable indicate that the older the individual gets, the less
likely they are to transition from non-employment to formal salaried, but the marginal effects are
insignificant in the full model.
6.2.3.5

Transitions from non-employment to informal salaried

Men had a higher likelihood than women to make this transition, specifically by 30%.
Higher educational attainment is associated with a lower probability of making this transition, but
the results aren’t statistically significant in all specifications. Being older is associated with a lower
likelihood of transitioning from non-employment to informal salaried work, but the results for the
25-44 category aren’t always statistically significant. Additionally, living in an urban area is
protective against making this transition. Nonetheless, the marginal effects are not significant in
the full model. The unmarried are 3.6% more likely than their married counterparts to transition
from non-employment to informal salaried employment. Finally, a higher level of father’s
education reduces the likelihood of making this transition.
6.2.3.6

Transitions from non-employment to self-employed.

Confirming the previous pattern of female immobility in the Egyptian labor market, men
are 19% more likely than women to transition from non-employment to self-employment.
Moreover, higher educational attainment and a higher level of father’s educational attainment were
both associated with a lower likelihood of making this transition, while older age was associated
with higher odds of transitioning from non-employment to self-employment, noting that the
marginal effects for 45-64 category are not significant in the full model. Both residence in an urban
area and not being married were protective against this transition compared to the respective
reference categories. Lastly, individuals living in larger households are more likely to transition
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from non-employment to self-employment. One unit increase in household size is associated with
about a 3.6% increase in the probability of moving from non-employment to self-employment.

6.3 Discussion:
This section analyses the findings related to the main study variables, namely, age,
education, sex, father’s education, and area of residence.
6.3.1 Age:
The results indicate that being in prime age (between 25-44 years of age) protects against
the transition from formal to informal salaried employment and non-employment compared to the
reference category while increasing the likelihood of transitions the other way round from informal
to formal salaried work. Those between 45-64 years of age are also less likely than the reference
group to transition from formal salaried to informal salaried jobs. These results are in line with
findings from developing country literature indicating that the transition from formal to informal
salaried work decreases with age (Tansel & Acar, 2017; Tansel & Ozdemir, 2019) while the
reverse transition increases with age (Bernabè & Stampini, 2009). These results generally point to
the vulnerability of the youth population (15-24) in the labor market. They also confirm the
findings from qualitative research documenting how Egyptian youth fluctuate between formal and
informal positions in the labor market in their quest to find a better paying job, a job that matches
their level of educational attainment, or a job with decent working conditions. (Sieverding, 2016).
It is doubtful, however, that the present generation of youth will enjoy the same prospects of
moving from informal salaried to formal salaried employment as they become older, considering
the continued shrinkage of the government/public sector, the main source of formal employment.
Furthermore, being between 25 and 44 years of age and between 45 and 64 years of age
increases the likelihood of moving from informal salaried to self-employment compared to the
reference category. Similarly, a previous study on Egypt finds that being in prime age is a predictor
of transition from informal private wage work to self-employment (Tansel & Ozdemir, 2019).
Likewise, the older age groups in Brazil are more likely to move from salaried work to selfemployment. (Maciel & Oliveira, 2018). These findings suggest that as informally salaried
workers age, they accumulate enough assets and experience to become self-employed(Maloney &
Arias, 2007). The two older age categories are also more likely to transition from non-employment
to self-employment, noting that the results aren’t statistically significant in all specifications.
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With age, the likelihood of moving out of self-employment declines. For example, being
between 25-44 and 45-64 reduces the likelihood of making a transition from self-employment to
informal salaried work, similar to the findings from (Tansel & Acar, 2017; Tansel & Ozdemir,
2019). Those between 25-44 years of age are also less likely compared to those between 15 and
24 years of age to transition from self-employment to non-employment, in line with the findings
of (Tansel & Acar, 2017).
All in all, these findings indicate that self-employment is less accessible or not preferred
by the youth (hence they are less likely to transition to it). Moreover, youth in self-employment
are less likely to remain/succeed there. This lends support to the argument put forth by (Krafft &
Rizk, 2021) about how entrepreneurs in MENA are usually older in age, having accumulated assets
and experience. This goes to show that youth who are supposed to be the target of entrepreneurship
promotion policies -given their high rates of unemployment- are shying away from it and are less
likely to succeed in entrepreneurial endeavors. The youth may be less likely to engage in
entrepreneurship because of the difficulties referred to in the literature, such as lack of
funding(Sieverding, 2012; Zamzam, 2017). It also may be the case that being in self-employment
is not rewarding enough or prestigious enough for youth, given that most entrepreneurial work in
Egypt is blue-collar in agricultural or wholesale and retail(Krafft & Rizk, 2021).
6.3.2 Gender:
It is noticeable from the findings that females are immobile compared to men, except if
they are moving towards non-employment in line with the previous literature on developing
countries (Bernabè & Stampini, 2009; Tansel & Acar, 2017; Tansel & Ozdemir, 2019). This result
also confirms the findings from female transition matrices highlighting high rates of transitions to
non-employment from all labor market states. Several explanations have been advanced for the
low levels of labor force participation/unemployment among women in the middle east in general
and in Egypt despite the high levels of educational attainment achieved by women in recent years.
One explanation for high rates of female unemployment and economic inactivity is the changing
opportunity structure available to women after downsizing the government and public sector that
started in the 1990s (Assaad et al., 2020). On the other hand, cultural norms that confine women
to performing domestic and care activities could be responsible for female inactivity. These
cultural constraints are far more binding for ever-married women; currently employed, evermarried women spend the same amount of time on domestic activities as ever-married women who
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are not working. Moreover, ever-married women spend, on average, longer hours on domestic
activities compared to never-married women. (Hendy, 2015). Lastly, commentators highlight how
women and their families tend to have “reservation working conditions” and will be unwilling to
take on jobs with poor working conditions for fear of sexual harassment and tarnishing the
reputation of the female worker. The fact that employment is informalized in Egypt curtails
women’s chances of participating in the labor force and increases their unemployment rate
compared to men. (Krafft & Assaad, 2015). The reality of women in MENA and Egypt, however,
contrasts with findings of women in many other developing countries who tend to be
overrepresented in informal employment(Danquah et al., 2019; Maloney & Arias, 2007; Ulyssea,
2020).
6.3.3 Education:
The results for the education variable indicate that higher educational attainment is
protective against the transition from formal to informal salaried and self-employment. Previous
literature similarly finds that higher educational attainment protects against slipping into informal
employment((Danquah et al., 2019). Studies that differentiate between salaried work and selfemployment also indicate that education decreases the likelihood of transition from formal salaried
work/government work to informal private salaried work (Tansel & Ozdemir, 2019) and, more
generally, from formal waged work to informal waged work (Bernabè & Stampini, 2009; Tansel
& Acar, 2017) and self-employed (Bernabè & Stampini, 2009; Maciel & Oliveira, 2018; Tansel
& Acar, 2017).
Education also increases flows towards formal salaried work. Those with university or
intermediate and above education are more likely to transition from self-employment and informal
salaried work to formal salaried work compared to the reference category in line with the literature.
Previous studies have found that higher education increases the likelihood of transition from
informal to formal private salaried work (Tansel & Ozdemir, 2019) and from informal salaried to
formal salaried work generally (Bernabè & Stampini, 2009; Maciel & Oliveira, 2018; Tansel &
Acar, 2017). It is also reported education reduces the odds of being in self-employment/employers
(El-Fiky, 2021; Krafft & Assaad, 2015) while increasing the odds of moving from selfemployment to formal salaried employment(Bernabè & Stampini, 2009; Tansel & Ozdemir, 2019).
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Lastly, educational attainment is positively correlated with transitioning from non-employment
to formal salaried work and negatively correlated with transitions from non-employment into
informal waged employment or self-employment. This means that those who are non-employed
and well educated will not leave this state unless they find a position in the formal sector.
Considering how the non-employment category includes OLF as well as the unemployed, this
finding corroborates the evidence from (Bernabè & Stampini, 2009) as well as the theoretical
model posited by (Assaad, 2014) in which youth queue in unemployment awaiting formal jobs in
the government.
The flows from and to self-employment by education level indicate its undesirability for
the educated. This could be an indication that succeeding in self-employment does not depend on
formal education but on the entrepreneurial experience passed on from one generation. In Egypt,
those with self-employed or employer fathers are more likely to be in self-employment or be an
employer (Krafft & Rizk, 2021). Another possible explanation is that self-employment is generally
not a prestigious form of employment (Krafft & Rizk, 2021).
6.3.4 Father’s Education:
The impact of the father’s level of education was far less than expected. A higher level of
father’s education is protective against some negative transitions, such as transitions from formal
salaried to informal salaried employment (for the university level of education only). Moreover,
Higher levels of Father's education were associated with a higher likelihood of transitioning from
non-employment to formal salaried and a lower likelihood of transitioning to informal or selfemployed. This could mean that those who are non-employed of a certain social class will only
leave nonemployment if they find a formal position.
6.3.5 Area of Residence:
living in an urban area increases the likelihood of transitioning from formal and informal
salaried work to non-employment compared to rural areas. It may be the case that individuals in
rural areas do not remain non-employed because they instead join the ranks of the self-employed.
As the descriptive section has shown, self-employment is more prevalent in rural areas compared
to urban areas. Moreover, self-employed activities are predominantly in agriculture (See figure
(8)). Additionally, living in an urban area is protective against the transition from non-employment
to self-employed. Lastly, living in an urban area increases the likelihood of moving to formal
salaried work from non-employment and informal salaried employment. This is in line with the
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results from the descriptive section showing that formal salaried work is more prevalent in urban
areas. It also highlights the disparity of opportunities between urban and rural areas.

Figure 8: Employment States by Sector of economic activity

Source: Calculated by the author based on ELMPS 2012 and 2018.
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7 Conclusion and Policy Recommendation:
This study attempted to understand the determinants of labor market transitions in Egypt,
relying on the Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey of 2012 and 2018 with a special focus on
transitions between informal and informal employment. The results of the multinomial logistic
regression indicate that sex is an important determinant in labor market transitions. Women are
extremely immobile in comparison to men, except if they are moving to non-employment. The
youth seem to be particularly vulnerable as they are less likely to transition from informal to formal
salaried employment. Moreover, self-employment is less accessible to the youth (hence they are
less likely to transition to it), and youth in self-employment are less likely to remain/succeed there.
This effectively means the youth are trapped in informal salaried employment. It was also found
that higher educational attainment is protective against the transition from formal to informal
salaried and self-employment. Higher education also increases flows from other states towards
formal salaried work. Additionally, there is evidence that the highly educated queue in nonemployment until they find a formal position. It is important to note that flows from and to selfemployment by education level indicate its undesirability for the educated. Essentially, the group
that is supposed to be the target of entrepreneurship promotion programs (the highly educated
youth) is less likely to transition into it and more likely to transition out of it. In the light of the
above findings, the following measures are recommended:
1. The new social insurance system suffers from major coverage gaps. It offers coverage in
exchange for low contribution rates (9% of the minimum pensionable wage) to “irregular
workers.” The groups eligible to apply for this scheme, however, form but a fraction of
informal employment. This means that other groups of hitherto informal salaried workers and
their employers in the private sector have to pay 29.75% of the pensionable wage. Even though
this is a reduction compared to old social insurance laws, it is unlikely to incentivize smallsized, low-productivity informal enterprises. Moreover, the self-employed and employers’
scheme doesn’t differentiate contribution rates between different types of employers and selfemployed workers. Previous experiences from other MENA countries show that frameworks
that increase coverage create different social insurance schemes for different groups of workers
based on their ability to contribute to the system. The system’s financial sustainability is
maintained by varying the benefits offered under different schemes(ESCWA, 2019).
Designing different schemes suited to different groups of workers has to be data-driven. For
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example, data from ELMPS and HIECS can be utilized to determine the levels of contributions
suitable to diverse groups. It also has to be based on deliberations with diverse groups of
workers.
2. Another recommendation is to allow employers to pay the contributions through an online
portal akin to the experience of Morocco. An online application should also be available to
employees to allow them to track whether their employers are paying their social insurance
contributions(ESCWA, 2019). This could empower workers vis-a-vis their employers,
especially the youth who are the most vulnerable in the labor market and who most likely know
how to use smartphones for this purpose.
3. There are also other approaches to empower youth in the labor market and accelerate their
formalization. One such approach applied in many Latin American countries is providing
subsidies to firms that hire young people formally or who offer internships to young people so
they can complement their formal education with on-the-job training. The target groups for
these programs could be youth who face other forms of vulnerability such as poverty or low
education. for example, in Uruguay, tax exemptions are offered to firms if workers hired are
below 25 years of age. Moreover, subsidies are offered to employers who hire young workers
between 15-24 years of age with little experience in formal employment(Work4Youth, 2015).
4. Entrepreneurship promotion programs must be expanded and must target educated youth and
women. These programs should be integrated, including financial and non-financial services,
in line with the international best practice. Also, the loans offered must cater to the needs of
program targets (loans for small and micro-businesses, not for the more established firms).
5. Considering the role of education in promoting formalization and in preventing flows out of
formal salaried employment, it is necessary to allow for lifelong learning and development of
skills for the least-educated workers. The government needs to update its skill training
programs so that they are more responsive to the needs of the market and are in line with the
international best practices. Coordination between the government, private, and NGO sectors
is also necessary to encourage enrollment. Furthermore, skill training programs may be linked
to social protection programs. The training programs can be offered to the beneficiaries of
takaful program, for example.
6. Enhancing inspection is also recommended to increase the cost of informality for informal
firms and formal firms hiring workers informally. While harsher penalties are necessary, they
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are not enough on their own. The ILO recommends providing training and capacity building
to government entities in charge of inspections to allow them to liaise information correctly to
employers(ILO, 2014).
7. The development literature highlights the importance of streamlining the processes of
registration and paying taxes for micro, small and medium enterprises to encourage them to
formalize their operations. It also suggests providing them with tax incentives(ILO, 2014). The
government in Egypt has taken steps in this regard by adopting the small enterprises law (Law
141 of 2004) and, more recently, the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) Law No
152 of 2020. We are yet to see the impact of the latest law on the behavior of small enterprises.
Nonetheless, for these reforms to work, targeted groups (firms in the informal sector) have to
be made aware of them through information campaigns and training sessions. This will help
build trust and alleviate suspicion between employers of informal enterprises and the
government.
8. Several measures should be taken to deal with the low levels of female labor market
participation and unemployment. This requires multifaceted efforts to deal with all possible
causes of this phenomenon:
a. Providing access to affordable and good-quality childcare. Previous studies
recommend providing conditional childcare subsidies to encourage women to take up
employment (Hendy, 2015a)
b. Encouraging flexibility in working hours (such as offering part-time jobs) and allowing
women to work from home. Moreover, maternity leaves (between 7 and 10 months)
are necessary to allow women to keep full-time jobs and advance in their careers.
(Hendy, 2015a)
c. Activating the role of equal opportunity units in dealing with discrimination against
women and sexual harassment in the workplace in collaboration with the Ministry of
Manpower.
9. Lastly, future studies on labor market transitions in Egypt should consider the impact of the
2016 economic reforms. This is possible by relying on the historical data module in the
ELMPS, which asks respondents about their previous jobs and whether they had a
contract/social security in these jobs. It is important to note, however, that relying on historical
data runs the risk of recall bias.
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8 Appendix (1): Regression Tables:
Transitions From Formal Employment
Table 7: Transitions from Formal Salaried to Informal Salaried Employment

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

0.104***

0.0893***

0.0850***

0.0853***

0.0877***

0.0882***

0.0869***

(0.00911)

(0.00985)

(0.0100)

(0.0101)

(0.00993)

(0.00990)

(0.00994)

-0.113***

-0.167***

-0.170***

-0.179***

-0.188***

-0.169***

(0.0213)

(0.0248)

(0.0252)

(0.0253)

(0.0258)

(0.0259)

-0.0614***

-0.115***

-0.117***

-0.124***

-0.132***

-0.122***

(0.0214)

(0.0248)

(0.0250)

(0.0252)

(0.0256)

(0.0251)

-0.0189

-0.0590**

-0.0607**

-0.0624**

-0.0655**

-0.0622**

(0.0270)

(0.0300)

(0.0302)

(0.0304)

(0.0309)

(0.0298)

-0.211***

-0.211***

-0.146***

-0.140***

-0.147***

(0.0309)

(0.0309)

(0.0290)

(0.0283)

(0.0290)

-0.113***

-0.112***

-0.0505*

-0.0477*

-0.0526*

(0.0311)

(0.0311)

(0.0288)

(0.0281)

(0.0288)

Sex:
Male

Education:
University

Intermediate&above

Less Intermediate

Age
45-64

25-44

74

Residence:
urban

0.00973

0.00290

-0.00156

0.00354

(0.0101)

(0.0101)

(0.0102)

(0.0103)

0.0834***

0.0870***

0.0921***

(0.0183)

(0.0183)

(0.0187)

-0.00999***

-0.0107***

(0.00296)

(0.00297)

Marital Status
Not Married

hhsize
Father’s Education
University

-0.0581***
(0.0170)

Intermediate&above

-0.0192
(0.0160)

Less Intermediate

-0.0211
(0.0146)

Observations

3,995

3,992

3,992

3,992

Source: Constructed by the author based on ELMPS 2012,2018

75

3,992

3,992

3,992

Table 8: transitions from Formal Salaried to Self Employed

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

0.0451***

0.0410***

0.0416***

0.0410***

0.0412***

0.0412***

0.0413***

(0.00464)

(0.00480)

(0.00480)

(0.00483)

(0.00485)

(0.00485)

(0.00486)

-0.0562***

-0.0477***

-0.0429***

-0.0430***

-0.0429***

-0.0451***

(0.0143)

(0.0136)

(0.0132)

(0.0132)

(0.0133)

(0.0141)

-0.0522***

-0.0440***

-0.0402***

-0.0400***

-0.0398***

-0.0398***

(0.0141)

(0.0133)

(0.0129)

(0.0129)

(0.0129)

(0.0133)

-0.0266

-0.0195

-0.0163

-0.0159

-0.0157

-0.0150

(0.0173)

(0.0165)

(0.0161)

(0.0161)

(0.0160)

(0.0164)

0.00185

0.00219

0.00435

0.00485

0.00494

(0.0168)

(0.0168)

(0.0183)

(0.0183)

(0.0184)

-0.0144

-0.0148

-0.0134

-0.0132

-0.0133

(0.0161)

(0.0162)

(0.0171)

(0.0171)

(0.0171)

-0.0115*

-0.0118*

-0.0121*

-0.0123*

(0.00608)

(0.00613)

(0.00619)

(0.00633)

Sex:
Male

Education:
University

Intermediate&above

Less Intermediate

Age
45-64

25-44

Residence:
urban

76

Marital Status
Not Married

0.00556

0.00577

0.00510

(0.0120)

(0.0120)

(0.0119)

-0.000320

-0.000303

(0.00163)

(0.00164)

hhsize
Father’s Education
University

0.0120
(0.0171)

Intermediate&above

0.00861
(0.0125)

Less Intermediate

-0.0161**
(0.00805)

Observations

3,995

3,992

3,992

3,992

Source: Constructed by the author based on ELMPS 2012,2018

77

3,992

3,992

3,992

Table 9: Transitions from Formal Salaried to Nonemployment

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

-0.0870***

-0.105***

-0.0869***

-0.0794***

-0.0743***

-0.0697***

-0.0699***

(0.0129)

(0.0142)

(0.0127)

(0.0126)

(0.0127)

(0.0126)

(0.0127)

-0.0827***

-0.00690

-0.0203

-0.0205

-0.0224

-0.0232

(0.0247)

(0.0190)

(0.0198)

(0.0197)

(0.0198)

(0.0208)

-0.0805***

-0.0293

-0.0378**

-0.0372**

-0.0390**

-0.0417**

(0.0243)

(0.0179)

(0.0187)

(0.0186)

(0.0187)

(0.0191)

-0.0430

-0.00221

-0.0100

-0.00957

-0.0103

-0.0125

(0.0304)

(0.0236)

(0.0243)

(0.0242)

(0.0243)

(0.0245)

0.156***

0.149***

0.161***

0.164***

0.163***

(0.0222)

(0.0224)

(0.0227)

(0.0228)

(0.0230)

-0.0463**

-0.0472**

-0.0400**

-0.0408**

-0.0410**

(0.0193)

(0.0196)

(0.0190)

(0.0191)

(0.0191)

0.0425***

0.0406***

0.0375***

0.0372***

(0.00993)

(0.00998)

(0.0101)

(0.0102)

Sex:
Male

Education:
University

Intermediate&above

Less Intermediate

Age
45-64

25-44

Residence:
urban

78

Marital Status
Not Married

0.0334**

0.0284*

0.0284*

(0.0165)

(0.0163)

(0.0163)

-0.00746**

-0.00746**

(0.00301)

(0.00302)

hhsize
Father’s Education
University

-0.00578
(0.0187)

Intermediate&above

-0.00688
(0.0151)

Less Intermediate

0.0157
(0.0152)

Observations

3,995

3,992

3,992

3,992

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Constructed by the author based on ELMPS 2012,2018
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3,992

3,992

3,992

Transitions From Informal Employment

Table 10: Transitions from Informal Salaried to formal Salaried Employment

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

0.00444

0.0102

0.0109

0.0136

0.00908

0.00919

0.00972

(0.0242)

(0.0234)

(0.0230)

(0.0227)

(0.0234)

(0.0234)

(0.0234)

0.294***

0.283***

0.270***

0.272***

0.268***

0.239***

(0.0310)

(0.0305)

(0.0303)

(0.0306)

(0.0306)

(0.0314)

0.114***

0.114***

0.111***

0.112***

0.111***

0.106***

(0.0122)

(0.0124)

(0.0124)

(0.0124)

(0.0125)

(0.0127)

0.0416***

0.0472***

0.0450***

0.0452***

0.0450***

0.0457***

(0.0125)

(0.0128)

(0.0129)

(0.0129)

(0.0130)

(0.0134)

0.0306

0.0260

0.0181

0.0206

0.0272

(0.0231)

(0.0227)

(0.0240)

(0.0243)

(0.0246)

0.0585***

0.0577***

0.0525***

0.0532***

0.0585***

(0.0116)

(0.0117)

(0.0139)

(0.0139)

(0.0137)

Sex:
Male

Education:
University

Intermediate&above

Less Intermediate

Age
45-64

25-44

Residence:
80

urban

0.0354***

0.0367***

0.0352***

0.0303**

(0.0118)

(0.0119)

(0.0120)

(0.0121)

-0.00976

-0.00705

-0.00835

(0.0139)

(0.0141)

(0.0142)

-0.00270

-0.00233

(0.00271)

(0.00271)

Marital Status
Not Married

hhsize
Father’s Education
University

0.0315
(0.0354)

Intermediate&above

0.0754***
(0.0254)

Less Intermediate

0.0144
(0.0181)

Observations

3,561

3,557

3,557

3,557

Source: Source: Constructed by the author based on ELMPS 2012,2018

81

3,557

3,557

3,557

Table 11: Transitions from Informal Salaried to Self Employed

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

0.119***

0.127***

0.128***

0.126***

0.123***

0.122***

0.123***

(0.0172)

(0.0159)

(0.0156)

(0.0160)

(0.0168)

(0.0169)

(0.0168)

-0.0338

-0.0237

-0.0208

-0.0137

-0.00538

-0.00676

(0.0273)

(0.0275)

(0.0280)

(0.0285)

(0.0292)

(0.0306)

-0.0461***

-0.0345**

-0.0342**

-0.0316*

-0.0285*

-0.0274*

(0.0159)

(0.0162)

(0.0163)

(0.0162)

(0.0162)

(0.0165)

-0.0694***

-0.0567***

-0.0566***

-0.0538***

-0.0518***

-0.0499***

(0.0173)

(0.0176)

(0.0177)

(0.0176)

(0.0175)

(0.0176)

0.0685***

0.0703***

0.0285

0.0208

0.0195

(0.0248)

(0.0250)

(0.0275)

(0.0275)

(0.0274)

0.0345**

0.0346**

0.00387

0.00123

0.00117

(0.0137)

(0.0137)

(0.0181)

(0.0184)

(0.0185)

-0.00407

0.000634

0.00440

0.00551

(0.0131)

(0.0133)

(0.0134)

(0.0136)

Sex:
Male

Education:
University

Intermediate&above

Less Intermediate

Age
45-64

25-44

Residence:
urban

82

Marital Status
Not Married

-0.0502***

-0.0575***

-0.0547***

(0.0160)

(0.0162)

(0.0163)

0.00716***

0.00729***

(0.00269)

(0.00269)

hhsize
Father’s Education
University

0.0710
(0.0555)

Intermediate&above

-0.00321
(0.0281)

Less Intermediate

-0.0355*
(0.0202)

Observations

3,561

3,557

3,557

3,557

Source: Source: Constructed by the author based on ELMPS 2012,2018

83

3,557

3,557

3,557

Table 12: Transitions from Informal Salaried to Non-Employed

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

-0.478***

-0.487***

-0.493***

-0.483***

-0.470***

-0.470***

-0.468***

(0.0352)

(0.0353)

(0.0344)

(0.0349)

(0.0352)

(0.0352)

(0.0353)

-0.0107

0.0108

0.00537

0.000177

-0.000816

-0.00842

(0.0185)

(0.0201)

(0.0200)

(0.0196)

(0.0196)

(0.0204)

-0.0109

0.00466

0.000816

-0.000624

-0.00107

-0.00466

(0.0115)

(0.0117)

(0.0119)

(0.0119)

(0.0120)

(0.0123)

0.0460***

0.0501***

0.0466***

0.0446***

0.0444***

0.0441***

(0.0147)

(0.0142)

(0.0143)

(0.0144)

(0.0144)

(0.0147)

0.0740***

0.0672***

0.111***

0.112***

0.116***

(0.0249)

(0.0247)

(0.0295)

(0.0297)

(0.0299)

-0.0638***

-0.0657***

-0.0414***

-0.0412***

-0.0390***

(0.0117)

(0.0118)

(0.0132)

(0.0132)

(0.0132)

0.0251**

0.0210**

0.0204*

0.0186*

(0.0106)

(0.0105)

(0.0106)

(0.0106)

Sex:
Male

Education:
University

Intermediate&above

Less Intermediate

Age
45-64

25-44

Residence:
urban

84

Marital Status
Not Married

0.0396***

0.0408***

0.0395***

(0.0135)

(0.0137)

(0.0137)

-0.00128

-0.00115

(0.00239)

(0.00240)

hhsize
Father’s Education
University

0.0262
(0.0397)

Intermediate&above

0.0321
(0.0232)

Less Intermediate

0.00992
(0.0162)

Observations

3,561

3,557

3,557

3,557

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Source: Constructed by the author based on ELMPS 2012,2018.

85

3,557

3,557

3,557

Transitions From Self Employment

Table 13: Transitions from Self Employed to Formal Salaried

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

0.0613***

0.0536***

0.0541***

0.0537***

0.0541***

0.0540***

0.0540***

(0.00636)

(0.00685)

(0.00675)

(0.00679)

(0.00675)

(0.00677)

(0.00676)

0.0978***

0.0971***

0.0929***

0.0947***

0.0926***

0.0815***

(0.0193)

(0.0195)

(0.0194)

(0.0197)

(0.0198)

(0.0201)

0.0501***

0.0483***

0.0469***

0.0469***

0.0466***

0.0439***

(0.00967)

(0.0101)

(0.0102)

(0.0101)

(0.0102)

(0.0104)

0.00945

0.00891

0.00840

0.00862

0.00844

0.00818

(0.00883)

(0.00900)

(0.00908)

(0.00907)

(0.00909)

(0.00942)

-0.00717

-0.00898

-0.0188

-0.0188

-0.0163

(0.0137)

(0.0139)

(0.0180)

(0.0179)

(0.0176)

-0.00219

-0.00314

-0.0124

-0.0126

-0.00972

(0.0114)

(0.0116)

(0.0157)

(0.0157)

(0.0154)

Sex:
Male

Education:
University

Intermediate&above

Less Intermediate

Age
45-64

25-44

Residence:
86

urban

0.00936

0.00972

0.00925

0.00698

(0.00871)

(0.00873)

(0.00875)

(0.00884)

-0.0103

-0.00986

-0.0111

(0.0112)

(0.0113)

(0.0113)

-0.000966

-0.000703

(0.00194)

(0.00193)

Marital Status
Not Married

hhsize
Father’s Education
University

0.0254
(0.0272)

Intermediate&above

0.0309*
(0.0180)

Less Intermediate

0.00480
(0.0134)

Observations

3,086

3,082

3,082

Source: Source: Constructed by the author based on ELMPS 2012,2018

87

3,082

3,082

3,082

3,081

Table 14: From Self Employment to Informal Salaried

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

0.306***

0.304***

0.310***

0.310***

0.310***

0.310***

0.309***

(0.0122)

(0.0125)

(0.0119)

(0.0119)

(0.0120)

(0.0120)

(0.0120)

-0.0630**

-0.115***

-0.113***

-0.118***

-0.122***

-0.0993***

(0.0254)

(0.0255)

(0.0259)

(0.0258)

(0.0259)

(0.0280)

0.0348*

-0.0501***

-0.0490**

-0.0507***

-0.0531***

-0.0453**

(0.0188)

(0.0192)

(0.0193)

(0.0193)

(0.0194)

(0.0197)

0.0358*

-0.0384*

-0.0378*

-0.0396*

-0.0415*

-0.0397*

(0.0213)

(0.0216)

(0.0216)

(0.0216)

(0.0217)

(0.0216)

-0.290***

-0.288***

-0.254***

-0.255***

-0.259***

(0.0235)

(0.0236)

(0.0300)

(0.0299)

(0.0300)

-0.115***

-0.114***

-0.0796***

-0.0800***

-0.0843***

(0.0226)

(0.0226)

(0.0289)

(0.0289)

(0.0291)

Sex:
Male

Education:
University

Intermediate&above

Less Intermediate

Age
45-64

25-44

Residence:

88

urban

-0.00804

-0.00930

-0.0114

-0.00664

(0.0159)

(0.0159)

(0.0160)

(0.0161)

0.0448*

0.0471**

0.0500**

(0.0234)

(0.0235)

(0.0237)

-0.00362

-0.00394

(0.00318)

(0.00318)

Marital Status
Not Married

hhsize
Father’s Education
University

-0.120**
(0.0476)

Intermediate&above

-0.0624**
(0.0292)

Less Intermediate

-0.00852
(0.0260)

Observations

3,086

3,082

3,082

3,082

Source: Source: Constructed by the author based on ELMPS 2012,2018

89

3,082

3,082

3,081

Table 15: Transitions from Self Employment to Non-Employed

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

-0.603***

-0.607***

-0.613***

-0.613***

-0.612***

-0.612***

-0.613***

(0.0180)

(0.0192)

(0.0188)

(0.0189)

(0.0189)

(0.0189)

(0.0189)

-0.00840

0.0157

0.0164

0.0138

0.0162

0.00707

(0.0249)

(0.0248)

(0.0252)

(0.0252)

(0.0254)

(0.0271)

-0.0104

0.0185

0.0187

0.0189

0.0198

0.0152

(0.0139)

(0.0144)

(0.0145)

(0.0144)

(0.0145)

(0.0148)

0.0426***

0.0513***

0.0514***

0.0507***

0.0515***

0.0502***

(0.0165)

(0.0164)

(0.0165)

(0.0165)

(0.0165)

(0.0167)

0.0259

0.0261

0.0367*

0.0386*

0.0418**

(0.0190)

(0.0191)

(0.0208)

(0.0210)

(0.0210)

-0.0708***

-0.0708***

-0.0602***

-0.0591***

-0.0566***

(0.0156)

(0.0156)

(0.0173)

(0.0173)

(0.0173)

-0.00121

-0.00246

-0.00143

-0.00267

(0.0129)

(0.0130)

(0.0130)

(0.0131)

Sex:
Male

Education:
University

Intermediate&above

Less Intermediate

Age
45-64

25-44

Residence:
urban

90

Marital Status
Not Married

0.0272*

0.0276*

0.0254

(0.0159)

(0.0159)

(0.0159)

0.00192

0.00216

(0.00231)

(0.00231)

hhsize
Father’s Education
University

0.00701
(0.0489)

Intermediate&above

0.0477
(0.0297)

Less Intermediate

0.0214
(0.0216)

Observations

3,086

3,082

3,082

3,082

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Source: Constructed by the author based on ELMPS 2012,2018
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3,082

3,082

3,081

Transitions from Non-Employment

Table 16 Transitions from Non-Employment to Formal Salaried Employment

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

0.113***

0.105***

0.0934***

0.0910***

0.0664***

0.0665***

0.0630***

(0.00751)

(0.00700)

(0.00729)

(0.00715)

(0.00705)

(0.00706)

(0.00678)

0.133***

0.138***

0.128***

0.130***

0.129***

0.113***

(0.0113)

(0.0120)

(0.0115)

(0.0118)

(0.0119)

(0.0117)

0.0663***

0.0650***

0.0618***

0.0646***

0.0642***

0.0621***

(0.00441)

(0.00462)

(0.00469)

(0.00487)

(0.00489)

(0.00504)

0.0116***

0.00999***

0.00889***

0.00871***

0.00872***

0.00845**

(0.00288)

(0.00300)

(0.00323)

(0.00319)

(0.00321)

(0.00343)

-0.0113

-0.0166**

0.00199

0.00170

0.00616

(0.00800)

(0.00744)

(0.00946)

(0.00944)

(0.00985)

-0.0148***

-0.0165***

-0.00368

-0.00372

0.000347

(0.00445)

(0.00447)

(0.00507)

(0.00507)

(0.00527)

Sex:
Male

Education:
University

Intermediate&above

Less Intermediate

Age
45-64

25-44

Residence:
92

urban

0.0213***

0.0188***

0.0183***

0.0141***

(0.00387)

(0.00385)

(0.00390)

(0.00397)

0.0338***

0.0343***

0.0320***

(0.00554)

(0.00560)

(0.00572)

-0.000746

-0.000518

(0.00105)

(0.00104)

Marital Status
Not Married

hhsize
Father’s Education
University

0.0278***
(0.00668)

Intermediate&above

0.0139***
(0.00505)

Less Intermediate

0.000359
(0.00530)

Observations

11,457

11,441

11,441

11,441

Source: Constructed by the author based on ELMPS 2012,2018
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11,441

11,441

11,440

Table 17: Transitions from Non-Employment to Informal Salaried

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

0.347***

0.346***

0.322***

0.322***

0.291***

0.291***

0.298***

(0.0105)

(0.0121)

(0.0133)

(0.0133)

(0.0153)

(0.0153)

(0.0155)

-0.00996

-0.0360***

-0.0329***

-0.0349***

-0.0341***

-0.00832

(0.0111)

(0.0117)

(0.0119)

(0.0120)

(0.0121)

(0.0132)

0.00844

-0.0197**

-0.0186**

-0.0195**

-0.0191**

-0.00934

(0.00792)

(0.00894)

(0.00898)

(0.00907)

(0.00911)

(0.00896)

-0.00436

-0.0334***

-0.0331***

-0.0358***

-0.0359***

-0.0308***

(0.00786)

(0.00904)

(0.00903)

(0.00908)

(0.00907)

(0.00878)

-0.0712***

-0.0697***

-0.0576***

-0.0575***

-0.0642***

(0.00730)

(0.00740)

(0.00866)

(0.00871)

(0.00829)

-0.0152**

-0.0146**

-0.000462

-0.000591

-0.00898

(0.00738)

(0.00736)

(0.00829)

(0.00831)

(0.00812)

-0.0111**

-0.0125**

-0.0120**

-0.00268

(0.00509)

(0.00509)

(0.00514)

(0.00525)

Sex:
Male

Education
University

Intermediate&above

LessIntermediate

Age
45-64

25-44

Residence
Urban

94

Marital Statis
Not Married

0.0304***

0.0297***

0.0364***

(0.00841)

(0.00848)

(0.00838)

0.000865

0.000415

(0.00124)

(0.00123)

hhsize

Father Education
University

-0.0650***
(0.00694)

Intermediate&above

-0.0392***
(0.00632)

LessIntermediate

-0.00860
(0.00794)

Observations

11,457

11,441

11,441

11,441

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Constructed by the author based on ELMPS 2012,2018
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11,441

11,441

11,440

Table 18: Transitions from Non-Employment to Self Employed

VARIABLES

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

y1

0.0712***

0.112***

0.145***

0.150***

0.189***

0.187***

0.194***

(0.00760)

(0.00994)

(0.0122)

(0.0122)

(0.0151)

(0.0150)

(0.0153)

-0.0894***

-0.0824***

-0.0633***

-0.0616***

-0.0571***

-0.0416***

(0.0100)

(0.00949)

(0.00994)

(0.00994)

(0.0102)

(0.0115)

-0.0756***

-0.0634***

-0.0480***

-0.0484***

-0.0450***

-0.0385***

(0.00797)

(0.00817)

(0.00787)

(0.00774)

(0.00774)

(0.00765)

-0.0870***

-0.0684***

-0.0558***

-0.0540***

-0.0526***

-0.0485***

(0.00810)

(0.00867)

(0.00825)

(0.00820)

(0.00809)

(0.00783)

0.0244***

0.0351***

0.0188**

0.0194**

0.0148*

(0.00814)

(0.00867)

(0.00861)

(0.00876)

(0.00856)

0.0464***

0.0492***

0.0335***

0.0316***

0.0283***

(0.00697)

(0.00686)

(0.00718)

(0.00723)

(0.00719)

-0.0469***

-0.0455***

-0.0438***

-0.0403***

(0.00473)

(0.00474)

(0.00477)

(0.00483)

Sex:
Male

Education:
University

Intermediate&above

Less Intermediate

Age
45-64

25-44

Residence:
urban

96

Marital Status
Not Married

-0.0356***

-0.0380***

-0.0326***

(0.00732)

(0.00743)

(0.00738)

0.00370***

0.00365***

(0.00102)

(0.00102)

hhsize
Father’s Education
University

-0.0528***
(0.00712)

Intermediate&above

-0.0229***
(0.00718)

Less Intermediate

-0.0186**
(0.00786)

Observations

11,457

11,441

11,441

11,441

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: Source: Constructed by the author based on ELMPS 2012,2018
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11,441

11,441

11,440
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